Official-level relationships between Ukraine and Turkey date back to the Cossack era and the Ottoman Empire, as well as the times of the Ukrainian People’s Republic. These relationships have proven to be important and effective, and are currently expanding vigorously, this due to the efforts by the country’s leaders and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as the diplomatic corpse, business representatives and grassroot citizens.
The significance of the Turkish track in Ukraine’s foreign policy is also evidenced by personnel appointments to positions at Ukraine’s Embassy. During the past three years, the Embassy of Ukraine in Ankara has been headed by Vasyl Bodnar, preceded by a deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, and earlier still by Andriy Sybiha, the current Minister of Foreign Affairs who chose Turkey as the destination for his first foreign visit in this capacity. Vasyl Bodnar, the current Ambassador of Ukraine to Turkey will now have to be replaced after having been appointed to the ambassadorial position in Warsaw.
Ambassador Vasyl Bodnar, in an interview with Ukrinform ahead of his departure to Poland, told about the results of his three-year tenure at Ankara, about the contents of Ukrainian-Turkish relationships and Turkey’s role in bolstering Ukraine’s defense capabilities and in recovery and rebuilding projects.
TURKEY’S CLOSING OF THE BOSPHORUS AND DARDANELLES STRAITS PREVENTED ODESA AND MYKOLAYIV REGIONS FROM BEING SEIZED BY RUSSIA
– Mr. Ambassador, your are wrapping up your ambassadorial tenure in Turkey. These years have been filled with important events for both bilateral relations and for Ukraine, for the Ukrainian people and the Ukrainian community in Turkey. Please tell us what gives you pride from the years you have spent working at Ankara?
– I will start with what I believe is most important- a contribution to maintaining a lively political dialogue between the two presidents and institutions of government, a high level of strategic partnership, from where all other agreements are coming.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Kyiv in early February 2022. That visit saw the signing of a bilateral agreement on free trade, which has been ratified by the Turkish party and is currently awaiting ratification by the Ukrainian parliament. On top of that, it has been agreed to build a Baykar factory in Ukraine. This project, which is now in full swing, is about $ 100 million in investments in Ukraine, in addition to the $ 110 million already invested by Baykar company. Furthermore, this is about hundreds of armored vehicles, UAVs, gun shells and other assistance to help Ukrainian defenders fight against Russia’s war of aggression, about hundreds of trucks of humanitarian aid from Turkey.
Before the war, Ukrainian-supplied engines came as a substantial contribution to the Turkish UAV industry’s growth. So we too have something to be proud of when attending presentations for Kızılelma [unmanned fighter], Anka 3 and Akıncı [one-way attack drones].
One of the critical stages of Ukraine’s defense was the closure of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits by Turkey. We sank the Moskva [Russia’s Black Sea Fleet’s flagship], while two more Russian cruisers were waiting in the Mediterranean. And the fact that Turkey closed the straits, I believe, did not allow Russia to leverage its maritime superiority to capture Odesa, Mykolaiv and other territories that Moscow planned to occupy through operations from the sea.”
Turkey has become a major transport hub for Ukraine. At present in Turkey, there is a visa-free transport system for Ukrainian hauliers. Previously, when vessels carrying cargoes for Ukraine made stops at Turkish ports, regulations prohibited Ukrainian hauliers to enter the ports to pick up the cargoes for further transportation. Currently, the transport visa-free regime is in effect. Now our companies, without any licenses or permits, can transport cargoes that Ukraine desperately needs from Turkish and other ports through the territory of Turkey in transit.
An important component to Ukraine’s sustainability was the signing of agreement on the Black Sea Grain Initiative. Turkey was immediately involved in the process, and not only the export of 33 million tons of grain made Ukraine more sustainable and improved our international posture, but also allowed Ukrainian businesses to look into the future with hope, to sow and harvest.
Among the extremely important projects that have been successfully completed is the evacuation of orphans from Ukraine. Within the “Childhood without War” charitable project, more than 3,500 orphan children and their accompanying persons have been evacuated from the war zone and areas susceptible to barrages of heavy weapon fire.
Additionally, I would like to mention the powerful mobilization of the Ukrainian community in Turkey and the creation of a robust Ukrainian voice in the Turkish media space. Particularly during the first year of the war (thanks to our efforts and help from Kyiv), there was no significant Russian media influence being exerted on Turkey. This enabled it to keep Turkish society on the Ukrainian track in terms of information – to convey the truth about what is happening in Ukraine.
Another accomplishment worthy of mention is the completion of a new building for the Ukrainian Embassy, which was initiated by my predecessor in this role, Mr Andriy Sybiha, who currently is the Foreign Minister. Completed at wartime, it was a really challenging project which ended up in a success.
I could list many more things, less noticeable, but no less significant, but the main thing is that Turkey clearly maintains its position as a strategic partner, is firm in its political position that the war between Ukraine and Russia should end peacefully, on the basis of territorial integrity of Ukraine. And the fact that, despite all the turns and twists of the war and mediation attempts, Turkey sticks to its stance about the inadmissibility of Russian occupation of Crimea.
AT THE 2022 ISTANBUL NEGOTIATIONS, RUSSIA SHOWED NO READINESS FOR PEACE
– You mentioned the time when Russia began its full-scale war of aggression, when you used to give several press conferences every day, which were broadcast live on all TV channels. Turkey was actively attempting to act as a peacemaker, facilitating meetings in Antalya and Istanbul. What was happening behind the scenes, was there a realistic chance of the war being over at its very inception?
– Russian manipulations began two years after the events actually happened, this is a yet another attempt to twist the facts to its advantage. There were efforts made by Turkey to end the war at its very inception, and we are grateful for this effort. The vigorous media campaign that we launched and were conducting during the initial weeks and months of the war had its effect. The Turkish side did see the power of mediation and its exceptional mission, since it was able to communicate with both us and the aggressor country, tried to be helpful in finding a compromise.
The first round of negotiations at the level of foreign ministers took place in Antalya. But Minister Lavrov, unlike Minister Kuleba, did not have the mandate for this, and therefore could not make decisions. Then Minister Çavuşoğlu flew to Moscow, visited Lviv, trying to help the opposing parties find common ground. Afterwards the negotiating teams met in Istanbul. The Turkish side had the advantage in that they did not impose anything, but offered good services, facilitation support, assistance in organizing negotiations, providing a negotiating platform and an appropriate atmosphere. And this was beneficial for both parties, since each was defending its own position. Currently there is a lot of speculation and distortions of facts, most particularly by the Russian side. But we all know too well what happened after the negotiations: Russia restarted its offensive on Eastern Ukraine, continued killing civilians. Russian troops were driven away from the Ukrainian capital and out of much of the country’s northeast by efforts of our Defense Forces, rather than withdrew on the own “good will”, as Russian propaganda claims. Follow-up moves by Moscow revealed that Russia had no intention whatsoever to sign a peace deal. Instead, it sought to have control over all of Ukraine whatever the means and cost, was looking for ways to exert influence on Western partners. Russia insisted that Ukraine should never be admitted to NATO, should disarm itself, and demanded many other concessions which we deem unacceptable, which they later were promoting as if it was an agreed package. Actually, however, their narratives, which they were pushing forward from day one, had nothing in common with our existent position.
Attempts by Russia to impose its own point of view signify an intention to win over public opinion and turn it to its own advantage. President Zelensky’s peace formula has won support from most of the world. That means to say that Russia is losing ground, and so it is misinforming the world in an attempt to shatter world unity and secure support for the Sino-Brazilian initiative. This is a part of the hybrid war attempt to knock international support out from under the Peace Formula. I therefore have no reason to trust even a single word I might hear from Russian or pro-Russian sources. Instead, I stick to the facts. And the facts are saying that Russia was in now way ready for peace at the meeting of two negotiating teams at Istanbul.
– For all these years, Turkey has been offering mediation services, like Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan reiterated again in a recent statement. Instead, Minister Lavrov, in an interview with Turkish media, noted that Moscow does not consider Turkey a peacemaking mediator because of its cooperation with Ukraine in the defense industrial domain. What is your assessment of such statements?
– Well, I never listen to what Lavrov is saying; he is not the one who makes decisions, but Putin is. Lavrov just communicates particular viewpoints. Minister Fidan, to quote him in full, said that peace should be based on the territorial integrity of Ukraine. Peacemaking mediation is an important foreign policy priority for Turkey; a specialized department has been set up within the country’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is designated to deal with conflict resolution matters, concerning not just the closest neighbors of Turkey. In addition to looking for a peaceful end to the Russo-Ukrainian war, this is the addressing of the conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia, relationships between Azerbaijan and Armenia, as well the stabilizing role of Turkey in Central Asia and the Balkans. That is, if a country is influential and trustworthy, if it is strong and powerful enough militarily to uphold its position, it can offer such services. And given that Turkey’s relationships with Russia are based on interdependence and competition, this too can have a positive role to play in Turkey’s peacemaking mediation efforts. This is a country that has experience of influence on and relationships with Russia, and therefore has the potential to achieve its goals.
Looking at this alternatively, cooperation between Ukraine and Turkey in the defense-industrial domain makes a separate area of our relationships. We have not let anyone interfere in these matters before nor now, at the time of war. It depends solely on the interests of the two parties. Therefore I am fully certain that those words of Lavrov will in no way affect either our cooperation in the defense industrial sector nor Turkey’s peacemaking mediation efforts. Because, believe me, these efforts have never ceased.
TURKEY IS TAKING A CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH AND COOPERATES TO PREVENT THE CIRCUMVENTION OF SANCTIONS BY RUSSIA
– Russo-Turkish relationships are currently showing a degree of decline, particularly due to the pressure the West is exerting on Turkey, forcing it to enforce sanctions and restrictions imposed by the West in response to Russia’s 2022 expanded invasion of Ukraine. Can the decline in Ankara’s relationships with Moscow be a favorable factor for making our bilateral cooperation more effective and successful?
— I would say that relationships are like a sine wave. They are based on interests, on opportunities offered by other markets, and this can change, again and again. Let’s look at the level of trade, the number of Russian tourists, finally, at the Akkuyu nuclear power plant (which, however, has long be waiting to be finished). The basic things remain in place anyway, they are another element of interdependence. The Russian side is investing in Turkey, building in Turkey, the Turkish party needs these investments, needs this electricity for its industry and population. That is, all the issues related to circumventing sanctions are probably not of the kind that can be resolved once and for all at the level of the Turkish authorities. The process is ongoing. I can say that we have quite effective cooperation in this regard. All the matters arising from circumventing sanctions by Turkish companies are the subject for a dialogue at the official level. There has been set up a dedicated working group who visited Turkey to discuss these issues. We met with a fairly positive stance and a willingness to get the issues settled, rather than to counteract the consequences.
There is also a significant influence exerted by Western companies who are seeking to use Turkish territory for transit to Russia or Central Asia, for example. To counteract this happening, there is need for joint efforts with the US and the EU — the major actors that have imposed sanctions on Russia. Andriy Sybiha recently said that Western-made components have been found present in North Korean missiles. How do they get to North Korea? Of course, there is need to investigate the ways companies are employing to either sidestep anti-Russian sanctions or find loopholes in the sanctions regime with the help of buyers.
Turkey does not dominate in assisting Russia to circumvent international sanctions. Indeed, individual Turkish companies are suspected of cooperating with Russia, assisting it to acquire certain components, spare parts, equipment, and products. Such companies too fall under Western sanctions. What matters to us is to uphold our interests in relations with Turkey to the maximum extent possible so as not to lose trust, mutually lucrative cooperation, and prospects for the future. Potential avenues for bilateral cooperation that appear promising could include recovery, rebuilding and reconstruction of Ukraine, implementing the benefits of the Free Trade Agreement, defense industrial capability development, as well as the execution of collaborative projects.
FREE TRADE REGIME WILL GIVE UKRAINIAN MANUFACTURERS AN ACCESS TO THE HARD TO ENTER TURKISH MARKET
– You mentioned the Free Trade Agreement. What can we expect from it after it is ratified [by Ukraine’s parliament]?
– The Free Trade Agreement is waiting to be ratified by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, and I hope that this would happen ahead of President Erdogan’s planned visit to Ukraine (the date for which has not yet been set). Immediately after ratification and exchange of [ratification] instruments, a trade task group will be set up, headed by officials of the deputy ministerial level, who will monitor on an annual basis the agreement’s implementation and make updates to bring individual regulatory documents that have already been adopted on its basis in line with the terms of the agreement. What matters for us is that over half products of industrial make will be taxed by zero rate, and gradual access to the agricultural market is beginning to open. There will be a transitional period to see how far we can move forward.
The Turkish market is very closed. Tariff rates start at 35 percent and reach as high as 200 percent or higher. It is quite difficult for our manufacturers to enter the Turkish market. That being said, the first benefit to us is that our manufacturers of finished products, most particularly of industrial make, will have the opportunity to enter the Turkish market profitably. So, I suppose it will be soon for us to achieve the key objective of raising bilateral trade turnover to $10 billion.
An opportunity is arising for Turkish industrial groups to help Ukraine create industrial estates. This is another crucial element to rebuilding and reconstructing the Ukrainian state, because not only is this about highways, bridges and buildings, but also about revitalizing our industrial manufacturing capacity. And Turkey has the leading experience. Due to the creation of industrial estates, Turkey has been able to take a huge leap forward in terms of industrial and post-industrial growth. Because currently, for all the challenging economic realities, Turkey has a robust industrial base, which allows it to build motor vehicles, military equipment, and ships, and to export value-added products instead of primary commodities. The most conspicuous example thereof is grain flour and products of it. Turkey is among the best in the world in this field. But it does not always have enough of domestically grown grain, so the shortage has to be compensated for by imported supplies.
Turkish investors – both the biggest ones, such as Baykar or Onur, who boast hundreds of millions of dollars worth of investment, and smaller companies – are working in Ukraine, despite the war ongoing. Some day in December, we are anticipating that the Turkish Minister of Trade accompanied by a team of business representatives will visit Ukraine to agree on reconstruction projects to be given a priority, and to negotiate the involvement of Turkish companies in specific regions and economy sectors. The Turkish businesses’ involvement in full-scale reconstruction effort in Ukraine is among the key priorities for our country’s reindustrialization and post-industrial development to follow.
It should be added that Turkey is willing and ready to act as an intermediary for third countries seeking a role in the Ukraine recovery and reconstruction effort, but are reluctant to get involved as long as the war drags on. war. Meaningful practical work has already got underway with Japan and South Korea. At the political level, there have been discussions going on with Italy, Germany and France. This is one more potential avenue for cooperation, highly promising and viable.
TURKEY’S INTEREST IN BRICS IN NO WAY AFFECTS ITS SUPPORT FOR UKRAINE
– Turkey is willing and ready to help Western countries get engaged in the Ukraine recovery and reconstruction effort. That being said, however, we see it making attempts to establish closer relations with countries and blocs, such as BRICS, for example, that are considered opposing the West. What is your opinion on whether it can signify a shift in the country’s geopolitical orientation or is it a policy maneuvering (true to form for Turkey) for the sake of own self-interest?
– The fact is that Turkey claims the role of a global actor, and therefore it’s only reasonable that its interests expand globally. This is courtesy of Turkey’s growing capacities and capabilities, of its ambitions — industrial, military, and political. This is wholly normal for countries seeking their due place in the global world to establish partnership relations even with those countries on which they were once dependent. For us, I believe, this is exemplary. The time will come for us too to uphold our positions and relations with partners.
We too need to have strong positions that will be built on the basis of a robust economy, on the basis of our domestic arms manufacturing capabilities, and on our own security. It goes without saying that it would be much easier to start when already a NATO member, having a meaningful enough interaction with Western partners, working with them within a customs union, being integrated into the global economy by the help of Western businesses and investments.
The drifting towards BRICS, which has recently become visible, has economic reasons behind it. Particularly, this is the search for new markets and investment resources, soliciting Chinese companies to turn up at the Turkish market. That is, this should not be viewed linearly, as black and white. This is a multi-colored palette, it involves meaningful interests. If we comprehend these interests, it will be easier for us to interpret particular actions appropriately.
The most important thing is that, as we can see now, this process has no immediate impact on the level of support for Ukraine.
Therefore, in my view, we need to search for opportunities rather than blame the situation. If you look at the position pursued by partners, you will not discover there any serious criticism or pressure exerted on Turkey for its attempts to communicate more with China, India or Saudi Arabia. Moreover, not all of those countries are conspicuously autocratic. There are those who are seeking to find more advantageous platforms for economic cooperation to accomplish their interests. In this context, let’s not discard Turkey’s peacemaking mediation attempts. And such communication platforms or communication even with our opponents can be turned to our advantage.
— Can the outcome of the US presidential election impact on Turkey and our bilateral relationships?
– I don’t think the impact will be direct. We pursue bilateral track of our own, and Turkey’s relations with other states do not have a direct impact on the strategic partnership between that country and Ukraine. The overall context of the current geopolitical landscape, which can change as a result of this election, can change course of things in the region, change the trajectory of our fight against Russia’s war of aggression. Indeed, this factor must be taken to mind, but where Turkey is concerned, it is just the partner for us who well understands all the threats carried by Russia’s war aggression. Russian dominance in the Black Sea is certainly not what benefits Turkish interests. Let’s recall the favorable reviews Turkish commentators gave to Ukraine’s naval victories over Russia’s powerful Black Sea Fleet. Our wins facilitated Turkey to become a leading force in the Black Sea region.
Turkey is contributing to bolstering Ukraine’s naval capability by building corvette-class warships for us, and facilitating Ukraine’s arms manufacturing capacity to grow due to the construction of a Baykar factory in Ukraine. For Turkey, Ukraine is perhaps the only country to be that deeply engaged in defense-industrial and military technology cooperation. Turkey is advocating Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration aspirations while not advertising this conspicuously, because it too needs protection from Russia on the northern border.
Let us recall that many NATO partners at one time imposed a significant number of sanctions or reduced their cooperation with Turkey. Therefore, Turkey cannot do everything it would like to do for improving its defense industrial capabilities. And that is what makes Ukraine a willing partner in this particular domain.
UKRAINIAN COMMUNITIES IN TURKEY HAVE EXPANDED AND BECOME STRONGER
– During your ambassadorial tenure, you have fostered active cooperation with the Ukrainian community in Turkey: new honorary consulates have been launched, a variety of hundreds of events have been held, ranging from rallies and protests to film festivals. What processes have taken place within the Ukrainian community over these years? What would you like to single out as your key accomplishments in your work with the Ukrainian diaspora?
– First and foremost, mention has to be made of the great job done by Andriy Sybiha, the preceding ambassador, who was able to consolidate many Ukrainians around organizational entities. By 2021, 17 Ukrainian centers had been created which worked officially and were structured organizationally. The base for this has been laid down. Currently, the Ukrainian community have 24 of their associations working in Turkey.
During the first year of the war, approximately 850,000 Ukrainians crossed the Turkish border. Not all of them were refugees, not all of them intended to stay indefinitely, but many Ukrainians, especially in Ankara, Antalya, Istanbul, needed help. Our communities mobilized themselves, turned into effective units of help for the Ukrainians who arrived in Turkey. And, of course, the Ukrainian citizens who arrived joined in the community’s activities, which included rallies of protest against Russia’s war aggression, organizing Ukrainian language schools, raising and distributing humanitarian aid, holding varieties of events, just to name a few.
So, their institutional capabilities have strengthened a lot. We engaged local NGOs to help teach communities how to be more self-reliant, more effective and efficient, and to work within the Turkish law. Until this day, our associations are running humanitarian aid collection centers in many different cities, and humanitarian aid deliveries are still continuing to Ukraine. This made the communities more tightly mobilized, brought them closer, both among themselves and with Ukraine. The issue of Ukrainian self-identification has automatically become dominant, and communities have evolved into a powerful mobilizing force.
In time for Minister Sybiha’s most recent visit, we ribbon-cut new premises of a Ukrainian school in Ankara. Ukrainian language schools are operating in Istanbul and Antalya among a host of other cities. These are used also to help those Ukrainians willing to continue their studies within the Ukrainian educational system. Even if children attend Turkish schools on weekdays, they have the opportunity to immerse themselves in the Ukrainian context and strengthen their ethnic Ukrainian identity during classes at Saturday and Sunday schools.
Communities hold mass events, both educational and cultural, ranging from broadcasting Mavka, [the Ukrainian produced “The Forest Song” animated feature film], in Turkish to fairs and concerts. We have now helped several associations set up cooperation with international partners so as they could receive assistance of some kind, particularly in learning English, holding events, creating a more robust organizational base.
First Lady Olena Zelenska’s “Ukrainian Bookshelf” project has been implemented in Turkey, and Ukrainian language audio guides have been made available at major museums; a department of Ukrainian studies has been set up at the University of Istanbul, which is now ready to join in another initiative by the First Lady — – the Global Coalition of Ukrainian Studios.
Over these years, we have provided support for associations’ libraries, helped distribute information about Ukraine in Turkish. The Turkish book market has been replenished with interesting books – we have published “Kobzar” and “Forest Song” in Turkish, along with the “Atlas of Ukrainian History”, a popular science book on the history and the shaping of modern Ukraine, which have already found their place on the tables of leading Turkish researchers, and many more others.
Here I did not make mention of smaller, yet no less significant projects, such as commemoration of Holodomor victims and of the Crimean Tatars expelled from their homeland by Stalin’s regime, the Day of Vyshyvanka [embroidered shirt or dress – a central piece to traditional Ukrainian clothing], or, for example, the imprinting of a Ukrainian embroidery pattern on fuselage of a Bayraktar UAV or of a picture of Bayraktar UAV on a vyshyvanka shirt. These events may seem purely symbolic, but they have found practical recognition in lots of efforts that contribute to Ukraine’s defense capabilities growth and the country’s global recognizability, while at the same time ensuring a wider representation in Turkey.
IN RELATIONS WITH UKRAINE, TURKEY STRICTLY ADHERES TO THE RECIPROCITY PRINCIPLE
– Mr. Ambassador, is it already known who will take over your position after you leave? What advice would you give your successor about how to work effectively in his role?
– I am yet unaware of who will be appointed the new ambassador. This is a decision to be made by the President and the Minister. I had a very competent predecessor, and the advice I received from him helped me in the performance of my duties, enabled me to bolster what had already been accomplished and to give a development push to new projects and initiatives. A good foundation has already been laid down for work along all tracks, which needs to be stepped up and expanded.
The main thing I could advise is to set up direct communication channels with Turkish partners, possess a sense of the country, of its people, of their interests and needs, and to do everything for the benefit of both countries. I had a Turkish background, so I was returning to a country whose “landscape” I knew and sensed. Therefore, my advice would be to get prepared. What will also be needed are a strong team and systematic work.
Turkey is a country that strictly adheres to the reciprocity principle, not excepting relations with Ukraine. We are equal partners who can synergically complement each other in many respects. An understanding of this is contributive to more effective performance of tasks and helps bolster a positive image for Ukraine in the Turkish context, and accomplish the results our state needs today.
– What was the most difficult in being an ambassador to Turkey?
– I wouldn’t refer to it as a “difficulty”, but rather as a time factor. It seemed all the time like there was not enough time to implement what was conceived, all the projects and plans. There are still lots of them, and I will have to pass them on to my colleagues. As regards the difficulties, it is always exciting to make them into opportunities. If a person is scared of own shadow, then even a black cat crossing the street can prevent projects from being implemented. The Turkish national anthem starts with “Do not fear, fellow Turk, we will build the houses burned up again. We will restore your hope again”, and this is very symbolic. When we requested the closing of the Black Sea straits, few believed it possible. Almost the same was with the idea about a free trade agreement, which had been negotiated for some 12 years before eventually being signed. We didn’t have fear. If you don’t fear, if you feel that something is a necessity, then, in the current circumstances, we have to pass over what is considered common, standard. This is not about “red line crossing” but more about creativity and perseverance in accomplishing the desired result. For Ukraine, traditional diplomacy has already turned into military diplomacy. Complex issues can no longer be solved by traditional diplomatic tools which mostly do not work. Therefore, if you are strong enough, have enough inspiration, enough opportunities and creativity, success is always more achievable.
– You will now work in the country whose “landscape”, like you said, is familiar to you. With what moods, hopes, primary goals are you leaving for Warsaw?
– Perhaps, today, there is no other country as close to us in terms of mental proximity as Poland. Of course, for me, this is an opportunity and a great challenge both at the same time. I am grateful for the trust bestowed upon me and for this appointment. First and foremost, we need to work to mitigate what divides us and to bolster and reinforce what makes us stronger, brings us closer to each other. I used to work in Poland previously, so I think I am proficient enough in Polish to speak without interpretation into Ukrainian. I am confident that lots of practical things can be done precisely thanks to the constructive approach that we employed at one time, when I worked in other positions, developing cooperation with Polish partners. Indeed, there is a lot of work to be done, and there is no time to be relaxed. So, I think, I will be in Warsaw within the coming weeks, ready to start a new chapter in relations between our two countries.
Interviewed by Olha Budnyk, Ankara
Photo via Author
