Kyrylo Budanov, Head of Ukraine’s defense intelligence, Lieutenant General

The interview was recorded on February 24, the third anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion.

Kyrylo Budanov, 39, took helm of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, abbreviated as HUR, in 2020, after serving in an elite unit, where he would take on brazen missions behind enemy lines. Several times, he was wounded in action.

In November 2021, in an interview with Military Times, he outlined in detail Russia’s plans to invade Ukraine in January or February 2022.

Budanov is unprecedentedly open for a top intelligence official, regularly offering comments and interviews to journalists. Not at all typical for senior intelligence operatives, such publicity made Mr Budanov widely recognizable and, perhaps, played a significant role in him being among the most publicly trusted figures in Ukraine for the past few years.

Which of the recent HUR missions does he see as most successful?

Why didn’t the Russians “seize Kyiv in three days”? What military, economic, and human resources does the enemy possess at the moment? You can read and watch Kyrylo Budanov shedding light on these and other issues in his interview with Ukrinform.

[embedded content]

– Sir, three years ago, the Kremlin threatened to take Kyiv in three days but Ukraine has been heroically fighting the overwhelming enemy force all this time as our Defense Forces and the nation as a whole have put up exemplary resistance. How do you assess the current condition of Russia’s forces and their country in general? What can they do and what do they seek to achieve?

– First, Russia’s goals remain unchanged, they have not abandoned them and they’ve been vocal about them. Their supreme leader claims that the goals of their special military operation must be achieved. You’re right, their “Kyiv in three days” turned into the third anniversary of the full-scale invasion. So, obviously, as people say, “something went wrong.” How would I assess their current condition? Their professional army was wiped out sometime before 2023, and since then Russia’s been deploying mobilized personnel. Although formally they are all contracted soldiers, the approach is the same. They recruit someone, and in two weeks max they are already at the frontlines. They bet purely on numbers.

– The goals are the same, but how do they seek to achieve them if, even with their professional army at the time, they failed to seal the minimum result they’d expected. Also, they haven’t occupied Donbas in its entirety. What are their military and political leaders counting on?

– Just look at the war map we saw was on February 21, 2022, and the one we see today. To say that they haven’t achieved anything would not be true. They are advancing, but this is absolutely not the pace they were counting on. Indeed, we managed to hold them back in most areas, and in certain areas they permanently have gains. So they – quite correctly – understand that this war is a disaster for them, as it is for us, too, but they do have capabilities to move forward.

– And for how long will those capabilities last? Still, it’s quite costly in terms of manpower and hardware…

– This is a very costly war in general. A day of this war costs a little below a billion for them, and that’s a huge amount of money. As for manpower, again, we shouldn’t deceive ourselves, the assessment is that Russia’s mobilization potential resource will allow them to move forward.

But the pace and casualty toll – yes, they can’t just ignore it, so they do take this into account.

– If we talk about manpower potential, we see that North Korean units are being involved, other foreigners from Central Asian and African countries are being separately recruited, and also Russia uses North Korean, Iranian weapons…

– There is a bare minimum of Iranian capabilities there, now almost everything is North Korean.

– But, given this all, would it be right to suggest that this is already World War 3 in progress, or perhaps it could be a prelude to it?

– This is a philosophical question, it depends on how you look at it. To me, the answer is yes. The absolute majority of the world’s most powerful and developed nations are involved. It’s a simple fact.

– I understand that your agency has some of the most powerful analytical units. So what kind of developments to you foresee, namely in terms of other centers of power getting involved, both from our side and especially from the enemy side?

– Let’s start with the fact of them engaging North Korea. In fact, this is humiliating for the Russian Federation as someone almost claiming the role of a world power, or at least the world’s second most powerful army. It is humiliating, but the realities are such that they were forced to do this.

How the power poles will act is an interesting question. For the North Koreans, everything is fine here, because they are the main beneficiary of this process: their army is gaining combat experience that they haven’t had since the 1950s. And their first combat use after training in Russia exposed that it was a total mess. They were definitely not ready for anything going down in the current realities. So now they will be returning and starting to retrain their army – that’s one thing. Another thing is that they have “live-tested” their weapons in the fiercest battles.

The most interesting fact that I suggest you dwell on is the use of North Korean KN-23 ballistic missiles. Their first launches showed low precision, with deviations from target ranging above 1.5 km. Russian experts joined their specialists at factories, did some upgrades and modernizations, and now these missiles do hit their target. Also, the North Koreans learned what drones are. They’d never seen anything like that before. Now all of that knowledge will come back home, and they’ll start re-equipping and retraining their forces. It’s clear that a new threat will emerge for the Pacific region, because previously, when they fired somewhere towards the Sea of ​​Japan, everyone would just be a bit nervous. Let’s be honest, everyone understood that precision was low, quality was dubious, no one knew how it would work, but now tables have turned. And that’s just a tiny aspect.

– And what else is there?

– We can go across the world like that. Look at what’s happening, many say: Russia is encroaching on Africa, etc. They’ve been trying to achieve their strategic goal – to cut Africa west to east, or east to west, whatever you want to call it. To simply cut it so that everything moving there would have to go through them one way or another. To say that they are seeing no success wouldn’t be true. Indeed, they are being confronted there, in several countries their plans have been completely destroyed, but they keep trying. The African Corps hasn’t completely ceased its operations, it’s only been expanding. They were pushed out of Syria – but they are now settling in Libya. They proceed systemically. They might have some problems in Latin America, they shift toward Central Asia trying to do things there, even in Myanmar there are Russians, precisely their military.

– So they are pretty much sticking with the paradigm pursued by the Soviet Union, right?

– Absolutely. Russia is not the Soviet Union, and the question is whether there will have enough resources to keep doing that. In fact, even the Soviet Union turned out to not have enough to get to the finish line, although they were moving quite confidently. And that’s why Russia will try to restore its empire, and to this end, they need Russia, Belarus, Ukraine… There have no other option. As for Belarus, they feel more or less comfortable, although, let’s be honest, Belarus is taking indirect steps to somehow distance themselves from them, at least a little. That’s despite the fact that they are absolutely Russia’s ally, they are officially a union state. But Russia is still missing Ukraine.

– Their economic capabilities – how strong is their economy now, and to what extent is it already facing issues? What crisis phenomena we could make use of may or may not emerge in the future?

– Issues have already emerged, but we shouldn’t deceive ourselves. Even official data confirms that 41 percent of their spending is on defense. These are abnormal figures, almost all social programs, healthcare, education were curtailed to keep this budget running. That is, the negative financial and economic impact on the Russian Federation is already tangible. But again, I’d say this: as long as there’s oil, gas, metal, precious metals and stones, they will retain their balance.

– In a recent interview, General Naiev (Defense Forces Commander at the time of the invasion on Feb 24, 2022 – ed.) said that on the eve of the big war he hadn’t seen any official information or documents on when and from where the enemy would kick off their offensive. How do you comment on this?

– Around October 2021, I had an interview in the United States, where I showed a scheme of how things would go down, what forces would be involved and in what areas the attack would unfold. This information had already been made public by that time. See, if we made something public, it means it had definitely circulated everywhere before that moment. I’ll remind you once again: it was October, you can look it up, it’s out there in open sources.

– You said that on the eve of the war you gathered in your office and started preparing. And General Syrskyi (current Commander-in-Chief of Ukraine’s Armed Forces – ed.) also noted that during the defense of Kyiv, the units of the Main Intelligence Directorate played one of the key roles. And I walked a certain path along with him and I know he is very scrupulous in these things, and from what he said, there was indeed a significant contribution to defending Kyiv. If you can provide any peculiar details (I know that things were happening in Hostomel) on how you were preparing or how you confronted the enemy forces?

– On February 24, we did take our part, the answer is simple. I’m really humbled to hear that the Commander-in-Chief mentioned this fact. I remember those days quite well. We were helping in every way, he was then in command of defending Kyiv region. From the first days, we worked fruitfully together, which ultimately yielded the result that we can all see now – the enemy was knocked out.

The fiercest, most dangerous moments were in the first two days or so, while the main forces from the 72nd brigade were still pulling in. And, after all, we didn’t have much capabilities at that time, let’s be honest. And then came the (battle of – ed.) in Moshchun. These are the two serious events that changed the course of the entire Russian operation there. The first one was in Hostomel, which foiled their plans. Why did this “three plus 10”, or “Kyiv in three days” plan fall apart? Because in the heart of their plan was the landing of tactical airborne assault troops at the Hostomel airfield. Their planes were approaching, that’s also a well-known fact. But in the end, we thwarted those plans. And the second event was in Moshchun. As that battle was unfolding, had Moshchun fallen, they would have entered Kyiv at that time, from that direction. So these were the two biggest events. The third significant one is the battle of Irpin, which partially divided the Russian group, simply cut it apart, after which the Russian started retreating.

– About Hostomel, you said it was…

– …It was the heart of their operation, and in general, of the entire “special military operation”. It wasn’t called a “war”, but an “operation”, because it was supposed to be completed in “three plus 10”, so to speak. That is, no later than Day 14, everything was supposed to be finished, completely.

– What exactly was the role of your units in Hostomel?

– They met their morning there.

– What has been done there?

– Certain groups were deployed there. People were deployed in other areas, too, but that direction was critical for us. So we engaged in the first battles, jointly with the National Guard units that were permanently deployed there. And at the end of the day, we created conditions under which the Russians could not land a single plane there. We did it together, all of us. Mr. Syrskyi helped a lot with artillery support as we had none of our own. It was thanks to the coordination and cooperation that was set up ad hoc, on the rush. So on Day 1, we thwarted their landing effort. Everything else derives from that.

– And how have your units’ tactics changed over these three years? After all, a lot of innovation has been put in place, those deep strikes, other things, and lots of awesome missions completed.

– All these deep strikes started from here. Innovation for us was that we created large units and divisions, something we hadn’t had before, because this was dictated by war we found ourselves in. That is, classic missions by special operations forces no longer applied here. We needed larger elements. So that’s what we did.

– Do you mean units like “Kraken”?

– “Shaman”, “Artan”, “Kraken”, “Timur” and others are all large units.

– And how would you reflect on their performance? Was this a justified tactic?

– Absolutely. Since the enemy doesn’t really wish to confront these guys, it means it’s justified.

– Which three best operations by the Main Intelligence Directorate would you single out over the three years of the full-scale war?

– I’d say that for me, the very first operation was really important. I mean not smaller operations where our groups would cross into enemy territory, but large-scale efforts taken in Bryansk region. There were many opinions coming from different people that it wasn’t a realistic endeavor, that it would cause a nuclear strike… People were saying all kinds of things… But I was all the way confident this would work. At the end of the day, it did. I think it’s those combat operations that are most important, because the myth that you can’t bring hostilities into Russia, that this would cause some kind of Armageddon here, was destroyed. These claims have all turned out false.

– Many senior officers and generals in Russia now go to bed full of anxiety?

– Well, it depends. We can ask ourselves the same question. People tend to get used to anything. Unfortunately, this is true. If we talk about the number of enemies eliminated, it’s significant. Both we and the Security Service are actively working to this end.

– That is, the Ukrainians, those whose families suffered the most painful losses in this war can be sure that many are working to make the enemy pay for the crimes committed.

– A lot of people are working on this. For example, the recent case, where a criminal was eliminated, the one who brought great evil upon us, the commander of the Iskander missile division, who launched a strike. Remember the funeral ceremony in the village of Hroza, where that strike killed nearly 50 and left over 100 injured? So, about a month ago, that guy was mysteriously blown up at his own unit. Evil always comes back to those who bring it to us. We were not the ones who initially brought evil, but we are to return it.

– Is there any data on how much it affects the enemy morale and mental condition?

– It always affects them. But any impact has a certain lifetime. A single incident will not affect your entire life.

– Recently, in the third year of the war, a spy was exposed in the ranks of Ukraine’s Security Service, who served in a very important position – chief of staff. Have you had cases like that in the Main Intelligence Directorate, and what are you doing to prevent such infiltration efforts?

– We definitely did not have such cases at this level. We have an internal security department, and their task is to prevent human and other types of infiltration. As for the case of the Security Service, I believe that this is a personal win for (SBU chief – ed.) General Maliuk. He exposed, perhaps, one of the most powerful infiltrations. That was a great job, he’s a professional. I mean, he, personally.

– And what is your interaction like with the Security Service and the Foreign Intelligence Service?

– Normal working relations. Besides, there is an Intelligence Committee, and within the framework of this committee everyone works absolutely officially. Also, many events are held on a bilateral basis.

– That is, interaction helps create serious synergy in achieving goals?

– Yes, many routine issues come up, too. For example, an enquiry from the Security Service on a certain person. It is sent out to everyone, and everyone shares their data. This saves time, at least.

– Talking about the enemy, there were many conversations both before and during the war about who influences Putin, who makes up his inner circle, who shapes his opinion, and who helps him make decisions. What is the situation now? Has anything changed?

– Nothing has changed. The only thing is that Shoigu’s role has shrunk significantly. This is the only thing, despite the fact that Patrushev’s role hasn’t changed much. So this is an interesting thing.

– But what was the point of reassigning him, appointing him to some position that is not even secondary, but rather a caricatured one?

– That’s not true. The position of National Security and Defense Secretary s a key position in Russia. But the question is what Shoigu was restricted to in that position.

And you know what? An interesting thing is that Patrushev’s office is now located in the Kremlin. And previously, he worked at a different address. I’m saying, everything isn’t as simple as it might seems at first glance. Changes are overdue, they did what they did. But Shoigu did not become another Patrushev. He can’t even appoint his own deputies.

– And what about their new minister of defense? How is he perceived by Putin, their society and army?

– He performs well. He is perceived as a technocrat. Someone who deals with bureaucratic and organizational issues, etc.

– That is, he replaced a PR guy Shoigu, who showed off a lot of “Potemkin Villages”…

– Here the work is done more in the shadows, let’s say.

– But does it yield results?

– It does. Let’s also be honest, it does yield results. They slightly reduced the scale of embezzlement in the Russian army, they really did. It is still there, but it has decreased. It is more about developing, sustaining the Russian armed forces, etc. That’s something that lies on the surface.

– Now the key issue in the media space is negotiations on the issue a truce or peace. And you once said that talking to Russia about peace is talking to a murderer who is about to kill you. What can we expect of them at the negotiating table? What are they counting on, maybe some maximum and minimum goals?

– Of course, it’s the carrot and stick tactic, as people say. They will always do this: put pressure on us and offer various financially attractive things for other parties to take part in this. It has always been this way and nothing will change for them. Here is another question – will it be a ceasefire or peace? These are totally different things. It is actually realistic to quickly achieve a truce, I can just express my personal opinion here. But to quickly achieve peace – it’s not.

– If there is any data on that, what is the aspiration of their military and political leadership at the moment? To achieve ceasefire in order to recharge and then attack again?

– Yes, they need a respite. Because, according to their strategy, if they do not withdraw from this war by 2026, they will lose even a chance at achieving global leadership. They will only claim a maximum level of regional leadership, which they are absolutely not satisfied with. The cost of war is too high, the financial cost of war. It does not allow the country to develop, does not allow it to engage in large-scale projects, etc. There is a lack of technology, Russia lacks technological solutions, primarily in the development of the Arctic regions, in gas production there, etc.

– And what problems do they face? It’s far from an ideal country, of course, they are strong due to some totalitarian methods, but they have many problems, I am sure that you are studying them, so is it possible to influence any of their national, social, man-made, or demographic ones?

– No. There are things that we can work with, there definitely are some. You listed them correctly: first of all it’s ethnic problems, religious ones, and a bit of “man-made” issues. But this is not something that can radically change the situation in Russia. There is no other leader there. If a leader appears, everything can change in one day, as happened with Prigozhin, for example. If there is no leader, no matter what problems they have, everything will remain as it is.

His regime is absolutely stable. There is no one there who could pose any serious threat, such person simply doesn’t exist.

– And then can we go a little into futurology? No one is immortal, and this is people’s both strength and  weakness. After all, if all power is concentrated in one person, if he is gone one day…

– You’re going into futurology, and I’ll go into history, is it okay? This would not be a right kind of comparison, these two definitely can’t be compared. They are completely different people, of completely different caliber. But let’s take the example of Stalin. Stalin died. And the historical fact is that half of the country really wept, because people were terrified… After all, the man associated with the whole era was gone. But what started the very next day? Squabbles for power. And after a fairly short period of time there was the 20th Congress of the CPSU, de-Stalinization, and the debunking of the personality cult. That’s what happened. Do you think anything will be different now. It won’t.

– I can even imagine (Russian propaganda TV host – ed.) Solovyov.

– Yes, and he’ll say, “He was evil. He kept the country in a dictatorship grip”, etc. History always repeats itself.

– I agree. Now let’s move a bit toward more global issues. The change of the U.S. administration in any case is already changing the global order. How do you assess this could be reflected on security issues around the world, starting from the stability of Euro-Atlantic unity? We see Germany’s Merz’s latest statements that Europe is focusing more on itself, we see the Middle East, where the new U.S. president also promises to have a serious impact.

– I will generally refrain from answering your question, but I will offer a short comment. There is currently a state of strategic uncertainty for most European nations and several countries in the Pacific region due to the fact that not everyone understands the steps that are being taken at the moment. So this is a state of uncertainty. But it doesn’t mean that everything will collapse now, and nor does it mean that everything things will only get better. No. This is just a period we’re going through, we just need take this into account and accept that this is the way things are developing at the moment.

– Earlier in our conversation, you mentioned North Koreans in the context of the Indo-Pacific region, Asia, the technologies that North Korea is testing and improving…

– This will pose a real problem there.

– So they are returning, as you said. So, indirectly, the issue is of great interest, at least, probably, for South Korea and Japan.

– This is not their interest, this is their threat.

– Have relations with your counterparts from that region intensified?

– We had maintained such relations even before this. We intensified them a little with South Korea when dispatches started (of North Korean troops to Russia – ed.). Yes, that is also obvious. We are happy to pass on to them intelligence on the North Korean engagement, and we have received something from them. too. This is routine working process.

– Another painful question. You lead the coordination headquarters for the treatment of prisoners of war. Is there a chance, within the framework of the trend that things seem to be heading toward some negotiations, for an all-for-all exchange, including those who have been in captivity since 2014?

– Firstly, I hope it’s the case. Secondly, we do bring back those who have been in captivity since 2014, albeit in very small batches, so you shouldn’t miss this point either. I believe that we will bring everyone back because any war always ends with people returning to both sides. Do not forget that no matter who they are, someone is also waiting for Russians to come back home. It’s their families. The country, perhaps, not so much, but the families are.

– And are there some kind of taboos where the enemy flatly refuses to exchange someone?

– There are not taboos, but there are problem categories that emerged due to our information wars. You know, in any information war, there are pros and cons. Certain cons of these efforts are that some high-profile categories have become problematic for both their and our sides. We have also greatly highlighted all the Chechens and the like, although there are pretty much shepherds from the hills. Who cares about them anyway? But our society struggles to cope with things like that. For them, the sharp issue is that of the Azov Regiment, the Marines, and in general, everything related to Mariupol. For us, the most vivid example is the Chechens.

– Is it true that (Chechen leader and Putin ally Ramzan – ed.) Kadyrov somehow influences these exchange efforts so that his people are put on the top of swap lists?

– No, this isn’t true.

– You were right about information wars and information security: you have a powerful strategic communications unit in place and you personally communicate in a rather unconventional way. Have you already analyzed this experience? How do you manage to effectively counter Russian propaganda? Can you outsmart it?

– Sometimes it works, sometimes it doesn’t. I’d say this: we may suffer defeats, but we may also achieve gains. I think everyone would understand this. An example of our nationwide “not-yet-a-win”, let’s phrase this diplomatically, is the massive disinformation campaign that they have launched to undermine our military mobilization. Let’s admit, this is a serious campaign that has an impact on our people’s minds. Just think about it, perhaps one or two rogue incidents occur in a week, but when you look across the internet, it seems that at least a hundred of them occur on a daily basis. This is an example of a professional psychological operation to mess up people’s minds.

– So this is an old Soviet school, now armed with the new trends, like social media?

– Yes. By the way, that old school is perfectly fine. I don’t share the opinion of many that everything old should be destroyed and then we have to come up with something new. This is not the case here. That toolkit still works.

– I think you also profess the principle that whatever works should just be improved.

– Only improved, and in no case destroyed or reformed, etc.

– By the way, let me continue on the topic of destabilization. Now, in addition to the issue of military draft offices, there are rumors that Russia seeks to undermine our domestic political situation.

– What do you mean by “seeks”? It’s already happening, let’s also admit that. Here, many factors play their role, but they had started this systemic work back in the fall of 2023. This is a plot to sow public distrust in our authorities. This dates back even to mid-2023.

– By the way, perhaps the enemy is taking advantage of the public distress in the third year of the big war, even some stress-resistant people are struggling. What kind of support do you think our society needs, perhaps certain messaging from the military and political leadership, our Defense Forces?

– I do have the answer here and, unfortunately, it may sound a bit unpleasant, but this answer has been around for thousands of years. A worn-out society comes to life and awakens only when it sees wins. If there are no wins, no matter what you do, nothing will help. That is why we need wins – be they diplomatic, political, social, or military. No one around the world loves or respects losers, no matter what anyone says.

– Then a personal question: what is your faith in victory based on and what is victory for you?

– My faith is based on the intelligence that I have, and thank God, I have plenty. I can analyze many aspects both on a global scale and domestically, I have something to work with. Also, we should have this faith regardless. If we lose faith, there is no point in doing anything whatsoever. Because someone without faith will never achieve anything, not just victories, but any gains as such. An athlete who doesn’t believe in once becoming a champion will never become one, and the same applies here.

– By the way, after the victory, we would have, in fact, the most battle-hardened army on the continent, right?

– But next to us, another most experienced army will remain in place, unfortunately.

– Unfortunately, yes, but I think that at least the fact that you served as an officer in the 1990s and early 2000s, both as cadet and officer, you remember that there was such a peculiar pacifist vibe. Society was totally detached from the army, as if to say “do we need this all anyway”? Now the public attitude towards these things has changed. How do you think we should correctly build a ceasefire or peace into our national self-defense system?

– It is a difficult and painful issue for me, and I’m just afraid of the events of the 1990s repeating. I am really wary of this and I hope we will not repeat the mistakes that were made in the period from 1992 to 2014, I really hope so. Because then, too, we had Europe’s largest army, only second to Russia’s, we had the third most powerful nuclear arsenal, we had the most developed material and technical base, the highest-end technology, we had it all. And then we degraded to the level we all know about. Veterans of the Afghanistan war, we had all of that, everything was in our hands, but we destroyed it all ourselves. There can be a lot of debate on who stood behind this, why was it done this way, but this is a true fact.

– You said for you this was a personal issue, in the 1990s you saw it, and I saw it, unfortunately.

– I was still a child when I saw it. You can just look at the statistics of what we had in Ukraine in 1991 and what we had as we entered the year 2014. It’s terrifying.

– I agree, as a military journalist. Unfortunately, I saw that, too.

– Even the issue of the Black Sea Fleet, its distribution, which was incorrect, simply wrong, I agree with that. But what we had then, back in 1997, compared with what he had by 2014… These are scary numbers, we had three ships – such as the Hetman Sahaidachnyi – it’s just a small note… How many coastal missile systems and similar weapons we had, how many aviation groups there were… We destroyed this all ourselves.

– By the way, I would personally like to know how you have become who you are, who you formed your character, worldview, and how you chose this job?

– You know, I remember back in my childhood days, I read a book. It was translated, but its original title was “Self-made man”. I guess I basically followed this path.

– Are you satisfied?

– I’d like to be better than what I see, but in principle, more or less so.

– Is your public image in line with how you perceive yourself?

– You know, I don’t really think about it that much, maybe few people will believe this, but this is a secondary issue for me. I set a goal and pursue it, nothing else matters to me. I think people see we are doing our job not too bad, also in conditions where our country lacks wins. We don’t have too much of them either, but from time to time, we do have some small ones. That’s my opinion.

– I really appreciate you having this conversation and I wish that you, your operatives, and all of us have more wins to come.

Serhiy Cherevatyi

Watch the full video version of the interview on our Ukrinform TV YouTube channel

---

Source: Kyrylo Budanov, Head of Ukraine's defense intelligence, Lieutenant General