The now iconic 414th Independent UAS Regiment, popularly known as Madiar’s Birds, is about to expand into an independent brigade in a little while. The would-be brigade commander, Captain Robert Browdy announced this on his social media platforms the other day, while simultaneously announcing recruitment and fund rising campaigns for his unit.
Madiar’s Birds has long been a brand in itself. Videos showing its UAS operators disposing of “worms” (as Madiar refers to enemy soldiers being targeted – translator’s note), accompanied with Madiar’s proprietary style comments, instantly get tens of thousands views within a matter of hours and quite consistently. More than 1,200 civilians applied to join the Madiar’s Birds 14th UAS Regiment as soon as on the third day after recruitment had been announced and advertised in social networks, and UAH 23 million worth of donations from Ukrainians has been raised. It took just one year for Madiar’s Birds to grow from a company into an independent battalion, then independent regiment, and ultimately a full-size brigade, representing a progress that is going to benefit the battlefield and all of Ukraine generally.
In this Victory Commanders series interview with Ukrinform, Madiar was speaking about his expectations from this company-to-brigade expansion, about how much it costs to raise a drone operator to proficiency and to engage an enemy target, about the future advancement of UAV technologies, and about the way the Madiar Birds’s regiment has evolved into an autonomous organism in which each life is valued and protected.
WHOSE DRONE IS MORE CAPABLE
– Mr. Robert, you announced the other day that Madiar’S Birds would be expanded into a brigade. What does this mean in practical terms?
– This is an organic expansion into the next level military unit, stemming from an increase in personnel numbers and the resulting increase in the number of UAV crews of various specialties. Our activities are not limited to the employment of reconnaissance and strike UAVs alone, but we have more than 12 layers of influence. Therefore, with this expansion, we are increasing our range of capabilities, particularly in specific domains such as radio interception, electronic warfare, the employment of radar systems, and layered monitoring of bandwidths to track down the locations of hostile electronic surveillance assets for fighter aircraft crews. We have long gone beyond the boundaries of the conventional applications for unmanned systems with which everyone is familiar. Mavic drones, first-person-view (FPV) drones, unmanned bombers for night missions (referred to as “Baba Yaga” by the adversary), fixed-wing reconnaissance and strike drones have become a common means used by all UAV units along the line of battle. For almost 2 years now, we have been building up our proprietary architecture for comprehensive monitoring of the entire space along the front line.
The first task is to search out and track down each hostile FPV drone taken off into the air. We intercept hostile video transmissions and thus can see on our screen monitors the same picture seen by an enemy pilot. Then, using electronic countermeasures, we jam a drone’s control signals to force it down before it has time to reach its target. Using electronic reconnaissance equipment of our own make, we create a dense detection network covering every 2.5-3 km of the front line. We cannot embrace all of the front line by our power alone, so we provide training to multiple visiting crews from different military units. An amount of 1,037 crews have already been equipped with detection systems and trained in round the clock monitoring of the entire analog frequency range. Commonly, an average unit does not have the full complement of necessary equipment. There are no job positions for electronic reconnaissance/warfare operators provided in staffing establishments of strike UAS companies or UAS battalions. But they are indispensable to enable a unit both to detect and track down FPV drone targets and immediately transmit the target’s data to electronic countermeasure operators.
The next level tasks address hostile reconnaissance drones like Orlan, Zala or Supercam flying to long ranges at very high altitudes of up to 4-5 kilometers, searching for designated targets and assisting in fire direction. At the outset of all-out invasion, drones like Orlans were impossible to confront, but now there is a network of radar assets (foreign-made, as well as Ukrainian made, even our own makeshift systems) that enable us to search out a drone target, track its trajectory at whatever altitude it may fly, make friendly identification, and ultimately destroy it in mid-air.
These capabilities should all be expanded to cover the entire stretch of the front line. By expanding into a brigade, we resolve the issue of extending the strip of influence on the front line. If there were in place 4-5 “organisms” like our regiment (which we are actively pushing for), we would be able to cover a strip of hundreds of kilometers long.
– What else is included in this “sandwich”?
– I continuously talk about these tasks, promote them, raise money for them. We make mines by ourselves. We provide a monthly delivery of 20,000 antitank mines for 95 brigades of the Defense Forces (see a report I posted on my Facebook page recently). The mine uses electronic components that make it work like a magnetic mine which is triggered by the approaching vehicle’s magnetic field. People are raising money for those “candies”, and over 60,000 mines made by “Sukrarnya” (translated as ‘candy factory’, this is how the 414th Regiment’s engineering service is named – ed.) have already been produced and delivered. We are instilling in UAV units a culture of remote mining to pre-empt the enemy’s assault, logistics, rotation, and evacuation operations. All potential roads, trails, crossings, tunnels, potential passages in forest belts are planted with mines. These mines are equipped with Ukrainian-made electronic components of a pretty high quality, and they are often really effective in stopping enemy advances. If each unit used them consistently and regularly, strewing hundreds of mines along the front line, we will be able to stop the movement of the enemy’s mechanized troops, forcing the infantry who were supposed to get somewhere to dismount. They will become exhausted, will be exposed by Mavic drone pilots and ultimately eliminated. This is how the enemy’s superiority in equipment and mobility is leveled out.
– Does that mean creating along the fighting line of a wide dead zone through which no one will be able to pass, not event a mouse? You once predicted that, after the next 6-8 months, even drone operators will become no longer needed as everything will be controlled remotely via the use of advanced technologies.
– Each of the parties to this war is currently working intensively developing and implementing highly intelligent unmanned aerial systems. The first thing both sides are focused on is to ensure the massive usage of fiber-optic controlled drones that are immune to electronic countermeasures.
– I this about a kind of cable unwinding coil?
– Exactly so. The drone receives commands and transmits a digital feedback signal using a cable that unwinds from that coil to a distance of 10-15 (or even more) kilometers. The range depends on the drone’s carrying capacity; if it is large enough, it can carry even a 50-kilometer cable coil. This moderately intelligent innovation, in a manner of speaking, does not make the drone fully autonomous, as there still must be a pilot to control it. But the pilot can be located in a more secure place where he will be less vulnerable to attacks. Such a drone can be controlled from lower altitudes without the risk of losing the radio signal or the drone proper.
This makes just a part of the technologies that are now being extensively integrated and deployed. While their percentage is still low, it is just a matter of time and it will grow. These technologies don’t contain any of unconventional components, but use parts that are readily available on the Chinese market, can be assembled and deployed in industrial quantities. It is just a matter of time, not even a prediction: analog radio-controlled drones will be ousted by drones controlled via fiber-optic cable (or otherwise protected against electronic countermeasures). It’s a matter of a short while: whose industries will be faster to bring these devices into mass production, because for now we are assembling them by ourselves. In Ukraine, some dozen manufacturers are working on these technologies, and they need time to get tested and undergo other procedures to make them eligible for public procurement.
The next level addresses the development of artificial intelligence. When artificial intelligence becomes intelligent enough to independently recognize the targets stored in its memory and distinguish between equipment types (not prototypes – they already exist and are even deployed for combat, but deployed en masse) – the aftermath of using UAVs will be far more lethal.
– You said once that Ukraine manufactures the best drones in the world.
– That’s true indeed.
– But that being said, however, there is a certain parity [between Ukraine’s and Russia’s military] in the quantity of drones they deploy to combat. These technologies and their constituent components used by us and the enemy are largely the same, obtained from the same market. What is your thought about our latest achievements in drone technology development?
– Where a Ukrainian-made drone can fly to 1000 kilometers and inflict damage – isn’t this a breakthrough in the production of drones? But massive deployment of UAVs and all the main activities are concentrated along the fluctuating frontline, that is 10 kilometers deep behind the fighting line and 20 kilometers deep in the reverse direction, and this is the area where drones are deployed massively. As digitalization is gaining progress and drone technologies are gaining in intelligence, this area is simply doomed to become a dead zone. No living creature will be able to move in it because it will be immediately eliminated by artificial intelligence-based drones which will hit everything within their reach.
Regarding the quality of our drones…It’s true that they are made of components readily available on the global market. But we are improving them constantly based on the lessons learned from their combat deployment experience. Where we discover flaws or imperfections, we immediately replace or upgrade some of the components to ensure missions are performed with the highest degree of effectiveness and efficiency.
THE SECRET OF EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY LIES IN PURE MATHEMATICS
– How high should this percentage be?
– For now, statistics on the effectiveness of drone deployments (regarding especially long-range high-tech drones) is kept confidential. No one knows of how many of the drones launched have been able to fly to 1,000 kilometers or how many of them engaged their designated targets. But things are otherwise with mass-used vehicles (FPV drones, night bombers, “wedding” Mavics, etc.); it is known of how far they fly, how accurate they are in detecting targets, how high-quality their camera zooms are, how effective they are in performing autonomous missions flying a pre-programmed route in severe jamming environments.
Current statistics put the effectiveness of FPV drones within the range of 20 to 40 percent depending on the unit deploying them. The statistics don’t include missions where a drone flew off and hit nobody knows what, but only includes missions where a drone had reached and hit its target, and there is a tangible record of this having happened. There is a variety of failures that can prevent mission success: the electronics stuff may not work as appropriate causing the drone to fail to explode, or a drone may detonate before reaching its target, a substantial percentage of them are suppressed by the enemy with diverse electronic countermeasures, some are shot down with small arms fire. That being the case, the efficiency of drone deployments both in the Ukrainian and Russian armies is average at 20-40 percent.
– How can this efficiency be improved?
– A lot depends on the level of crew proficiency, the quality of the equipment and ammunition used, and the quality of electronic blast triggering devices – they have many flaws because they are makeshift. This all must be integrated into a single unified system and accounted for.
We have an accounting system of our own, it is maintained at the unit level without any orders from the higher command. We do it for the benefit of our own. I can raise statistics on any of the drone crews for whatever month of interest to me to review the efficiency in terms of quantity, quality of use, which targets – spontaneous or planned – have been hit, which of the crews are working better destroying enemy’s personnel (which are far harder targets to hit with an FPV drone because they are moving quickly). Enemy soldiers hear a drone approaching from 200-300 meters away, they take off running, wanting to live. There is a separate class of idiots who are instructed to sit down and wait. But in most cases, the instinct of self-preservation works out, they scatter like peas, looking for a place to hide away. And this is what makes them much more difficult to hit with FPV drones than vehicles or equipment. Antennas, for example, are an easy target. They hang on a 15-meter high mast, supporting the work of the enemy’s FPV drone crews. The crews themselves are sitting deep in a basement, and I don’t know what to hit it with so as to get them smoked out of there. But you can disable their antennas, and that’s it, the crew can no longer perform their tasks. It’s as simple as that, and you’ll have a few hours, even a few days of much needed calm. They can no longer work against our positions because they need their capability recovered. And when new equipment is brought in (they can’t sit in that basement forever), you monitor the area and again hit their personnel or equipment.
This all makes up the practical know-how which isn’t taught in schools. Anyway, the use of drones in each specific location has its specifics, depending on the terrain, weather, proximity of the front line, whether it is mobile or static, offensive or defensive, whether the adversary forces employ a network of electronic intelligence and jamming capabilities. And this attempt of ours to implant a culture of total accounting allows assessing the effectiveness of the capabilities in the first place, to assess, for example, which of the government procured drones are worthless and need to be customized (adjusted to particular needs – ed.), and which are effective as is.
We can navigate in the quantities of the drones consumed in order to distribute them properly. Some had been procured since the onset of war and therefore have already lost their effectiveness, become technologically obsolescent. But the government continues buying them, drone pilots receive them, but this does not help improve the statistics on the quantity of successful target hits, even forcing the pilots to hide true numbers. Because they will otherwise have to admit that they fail to hit targets, and tomorrow they will be sent into the infantry in the worst case, or, at best, sent for refresher training.
Preferably it would be good to have the statistics from across military units, which is not difficult to do, actually. Conventional reporting would suffice, but that should be detailed reporting, not formal, Soviet-style one. This data assessment would enable updating the requirement for ammunition and components on which the effectiveness and efficiency of drone deployments depends. For example, most of the government procured, standard-issue FPV drones use batteries of insufficient capacity among having other disadvantages. We receive drones and immediately remove the batteries, replacing them with new ones because we need the drone to fly to longer distances than permitted by its specifications. But who cares?
– Is this a lack of interest?
– This is rather a lack of a beneficiary who is interested and knowledgeable in this domain, at least knowing of the number of combat-capable units operating in a particular area. We have a bunch of armed branches, a bunch of units engaged in UAV operations while not being organized into specialized unmanned systems companies or battalions. These are regular infantry units that make intensive use of drones but do not collect statistics, and consequently they don’t feature in the listings of those having a requirement for these capabilities. Where drone crews within a brigade are working to good effect, they should be prioritized to be provided with drones, should be given incentives so as they don’t stand idle losing their skills and knowledge just because there are not enough drones or the batteries are weak.
– I was about to ask you a question about the secret of the Madiar’s Birds’ effectiveness, but I am already starting to understand. This lies in your experience and expertise, honesty even in reporting, because it benefits you yourself in the first place. Plus smooth and sufficient funding (you said in one of your reports that your regiment needs up to UAH 100 million in funding every month). Are these the components of your success?
– The funding is not smooth nor is it sufficient. This is a problem; we just don’t shout about it but are looking for funding sources. What are the major deficiencies in other brigades? Personnel and capabilities. Some are lacking in artillery and ammunition, others in tanks. We, on our part, have enough personnel. Regarding capabilities, there is no shortage of them in Ukraine, they are readily available on the market. But we are lacking financial resources. To sustain these high-budget specialized units, a separate budget should be provided at the state level.
We maintain a listing of our requirements which we have been compiling with our blood and sweat during three years. It contains 400 items, starting, excuse me, with condoms and firewood. Condoms are needed for purposes of one sort (they, filled with water, are used to replace ammunition during training, – ed.), and firewood for another – you need something to warm up with. And this must be provided for.
Each particular unit has a list of requirements of its own depending on its specifics. To enable a Mavic drone, for example, to fly 30-40-50 carousel missions, its crew requires over 75 different items, disposable as well as reusable: a Starlink terminal, a cable extended to the Starlink terminal, a mast, a power booster amplifier, a power bank for communications, a power bank for rechargeable batteries or replaceable batteries in sufficient quantities, a screen monitor for convenient viewing, a tablet loaded with software programs. Here I don’t even mention a vehicle with swamp tires, summer tires, winter tires so as to save both the vehicle and soldiers’ lives. Add to this compact spectrum analyzers that warn about incoming hostile drone attacks, jamming equipment and suchlike… And crews of each particular category (there are six different categories in total) have their specific lists of requirements. And they all need to be calculated for a year, at least on average.
And that is what we are doing guided by our experience. Each crew consumes 7.5 Mavic drones per 600-650 missions flown every month. So we have to keep 7.5 (8 would do better) rechargeable batteries in reserve. Using the batteries as is from factory is not an option since their capacity would not suffice for the required range and flight time. We attach a second battery to ensure a mission is non-stop. One drone returns from mission, and another one is already in place awaiting to take over the shift. We can monitor one particular spot for hours, 24 hours continuously, if it is of importance to us, changing one drone for another. But for this we need to have 20 fully charged batteries per drone, in which case there will not be 25-30 missions flown every day, but continuous reconnaissance will be enabled.
While we currently have an increased drone consumption rate, we have enrolled more than two dozen crews from the National Police, border guard service and territorial defense force in our refresher training program. I take them on combat duty for two months, mix them with my crews, provide them with our pickup trucks, jamming equipment, spectrum analyzers, masts, drones, Starlink terminals, and take them to their assigned positions. They start flying missions, exhausting the lifespan of our drones because they have yet to get accustomed to working in our conditions. But after two months they gain experience, and then I will take the next 30 crews for training. And they will return to their units trained and ready for combat.
– But the drone efficiency statistics have already been spoiled to a degree…
– The drone’s lifespan makes a separate part of statistic which few maintain, but we maintain it scrupulously. We calculate the average number of missions a combat, recoverable drone has flown before it died. Let me explain on the example of a bomber drone. We make 2,500 sorties per month, consuming 22 drones. And these are expensive drones, valued at USD 16-20,000 per “Vampire”, for example. So, 2,000 sorties, 20 drones lost, which gives the average lifespan of 100 sorties. These 100 sorties would consume 400 rounds of ammunition, (4 “candies” attached to each drone for one mission). Of the 400rounds of ammunition consumed, let’s assume that only 150 hit their targets. Divide it by per-drone cost of USD 16,000 and we can confidently report to the minister, the commander-in-chief or the president that one target costs USD 100 (the average for the regiment) to hit with an attack drone. With FPV drones, given the efficiency rate of 22 percent and per-unit price of USD 3000, the cost grows to USD 1.500 per target hit.
The cost of the war needs to be calculated so as to be able to plan, not to stand with hat in hand.
There is nothing complicated in this system. Not a single pilot of mine can say he has experience flying drones if he wasn’t flying them actually. If he lost a drone, this is immediately recorded in the combat log in a matter of seconds after it happened, and where there is a successful hit, a minute in and I already have a video of the hit recorded in the combat log – recorded electronically rather than on paper as is common for our military. The aftermath, filmed by an external drone, if there is one, and all the metrics are contained in one message: crew, target location coordinates, time, ammunition type, mission number, target identification, target status – hit or destroyed…
OWN SCHOOLS, OWN ENGINEERS, OWN EQUIPMENT
– I listen and think: much of the above would probably not have been implemented without your business acumen …
– You don’t need to expect acumen from everyone, we have developed algorithms – take them as basic and do it.
– I’m talking more globally: about the platforms you are using for recruiting people, about training centers…
– We do have schools of our own for quite a while, but we don’t advertise them to avoid saboteurs infiltrating and killing people out there.
– How do you achieve your goal of reducing losses to minimum possible? You have emphasized on many occasions that you care about this.
– I explain: this is achieved through budgeting (planning for future operations, – ed.) for each the newly organized crews. There is no such thing that I just take 20 guys, divide them into three, here are the drones – welcome and fight. No way! First come combat teaming, trials, field testing, working within combat units as 3rd or 4th assistants, and only then will follow organizing them into appropriate crews and providing them with security gear. None of my crews go on a mission without carrying a portable broadband jamming device which is a must have by default even during emergency evacuation from the battlefield. Entering an area of fighting is strictly prohibited unless having a jamming device, and the same goes for personal spectrum analyzer. It costs a miserable UAH 20,000 – the soldier’s life is incomparably more expensive. This is a tiny thing the size of a cell phone that warns you personally that an FPV drone is heading your way. If it is a high-tech device – we make them by ourselves – it makes friend or foe identification. If the device is even of a higher level of technology, you can see on your screen what exactly is flying and have a 99% chance of surviving. Because you’ll turn on your jamming device which will disable the attacking drone remotely, or move somewhere else, or hide away. Let your vehicle burn down, but at that time you’ll be hided somewhere in the basement, somewhere where that drone won’t reach you, and the next one will not arrive earlier than in 5-6 minutes.
Knowing that you’ve been exposed, you quickly transmit a report about the attack. And then our organic combat evacuation teams are mobilized (we avoid using external evacuation teams) along with combat scouts who would go where a medical combat evacuation unit won’t go, be it even hostile territory, to take out the crews into safety. A situation like this happened in the settlement of Sontsivka – scouts drove right into the enemy’s mouth and, acting in a combat-like manner, evacuated the three crews who found themselves encircled with no chance of escape. One of the jeeps was pursued, shot at, but none of the lives was lost. They were wounded casualties, but all were taken out and left away safely.
– Regarding, again, your personnel recruitment policy… How far effective is the approach you employ for recruiting Ukrainians in Europe? You seemed to be about to train them, solicit them for your regiment.
– For the most part, they are dreamers. They painted unrealistic pictures for themselves, and when it comes right down to it… However positive examples are there too. Those who really wanted to, contacted us themselves, we interviewed them, helped them return [to Ukraine]. They returned, females included, and were very successful integrating into our team.
And speaking generally, we have no plans to launch own recruiting centers in Ukraine. We have an extensive questionnaire which few will like filling out. There is a 50 percent probability that, right at the moment I call and hear your voice, I will be able to identify whether you are a good fit for us or not, whether you fall into a particular risk group or not. This is the first level of filtering. The second is personal communication. This must be exactly personal communication rather than communication through a recruiting manager, no matter military or not. I’m not suggesting it’s ineffective, just telling you how far effective it is with us.
A commander recruits into his unit those people whom he has asked all the questions possible and read all of the 94 points of a person’s questionnaire. Where there is a suspicion of a lie, the applicant is sent for examination and polygraphing at the operational psychology unit, and everything he hid is revealed. We warn about this in advance. If a person is no fit for our unit, we allow him a month and a half to two months’ time to find another employment and quit. If you fail to find another employment for yourself – sorry, I cannot accompany you like a child for the rest of your life. Falling in the risk group are those who are someone’s agents, heavy drinkers, or drug addicts. A single drunken incident and one is discharged regardless of the number of awards. Athletes have gathered in our unit, people of consciousness, those who know weapons, know what it is like to be on continuous combat alert. We purchase drug tests, and everyone knows that we can check at any time, and it does work. We even use dogs to search for drugs. And you are asking me what makes my people stay alive. That’s what makes them stay alive – good discipline and self-control.
– In a sense, you take care of them, like children...
– We take care of ourselves to avoid troubles.
– Regarding the troubles. You announced the other day that your brigade is open to recruitment in particular for military service members who deserted from service. Isn’t that risky?
– There are a lot of highly qualified professionals who used to be misemployed. I’m not suggesting that right now I will recruit 500 defectors of any kind just to get the complement filled. Nobody is behind me forcing the brigade’s complement to be 100 percent filled. Believe me, our work efficiency will be much higher with 50 percent of the brigade made up of appropriate people than with 100 percent, half of whom have to be babysat like absolute kids.
We warn that we reject 80 percent of the applications submitted. During our previous recruitment campaign, about five dozen applications were submitted for one vacancy. Some of the people are not ready yet, and we commit to train others. But if I recruit you as a motorist, then you are supposed to know how to disassemble that engine as well as you know the Our Father and the Hail Mary, because I have 25-30 vehicles standing idle, which all need to be restored back to operation, and immediately so. Or to be able to disassemble smashed vehicles evacuated from the battlefield and assemble three out of ten, thereby saving money.
The only risk for our unit is to have to withdraw from the front line. We need no recovery, don’t want to be redeployed to a hypothetical “Uzhhorod cauldron”, because the battlefield will lose from it. We currently do the absolute majority of reconnaissance, fire adjustment and patrol missions at the front line, supporting more than 20 brigades, because the brigades are exhausted, are short of UAV pilots, personnel and capabilities. And this slows us down a little bit, because we could have developed UAV operations to a more comprehensive, deeper detail. And the expansion from regiment to an independent brigade will make way for us to perform tasks at the front line, and, on a parallel track, work on intellectual components and devise special operations while at the same time maintaining our engineering expertise and experience, because no one will make ammunition for us better and faster than we ourselves can.
We have plans to develop “candies” of new types. For now, we have in our arsenal “candies” tailored for 52 different purposes, and we no longer make use of standard munitions. We plan to advance our engineering experience and expertise, because every Starlink terminal wears out, and every bomber type goes out of commission over time. You get a drone from the army, something in it breaks down, and the crew have to sit idle, because this was the only bomber they had, or maybe two. They pack it in a box, send it for repair to as far as Kyiv, where the manufacturer is located. What the crew is supposed to do during the two weeks waiting for their drone to return after repair? It’s no option for us. We would better sustain a 100-men engineering service of our own. At one time, we were pressing them, those manufacturers, to give us permission to do the repairs by ourselves. They warned they would revoke their warranty if we do so. But we don’t care about the warranty… The drone will die before your warranty expires. I justified this to the owners, our guys arrived, took a training course, were disassembling/assembling those drones thousands of times with their eyes closed. Then they returned, bought a stock of spare parts and here it is – a capability to do complete restoration of damaged equipment by our own strength. One drone of ours returned damaged from a night mission; a couple of hours in, and it was already in the workshop, and after 5 hours it took off for a new mission.
The third focus is on innovation, because nobody will do it better than we ourselves. We have a separate subunit specializing in design and development. Currently, we have 14 such projects in progress, particularly in domains such as artificial intelligence, fiber optic solutions (I wouldn’t announce the remainder). We have to our credit a dozen projects completed and implemented in innovative products, among them spectrum analyzers, mobile jamming devices of our proprietary design (which we make by ourselves and never buy anywhere else), electronic reconnaissance systems. We have provided training to more than a thousand drone crews and delivered a thousand systems. I have already said in public who received them. Today we have 14 projects in progress, tomorrow there will be 20 or 30 whenever required.
ADOPTED FROM EXPERIENCE IN BATTLE GROUND
– I have often heard various military experts maintaining that drones are O.K., but still artillery is the king of the battlefield, and a soldier will be unable to hold a position using drones alone. Isn’t that the case?
– There are core artillery brigades that are responsible for particular stretches of the frontline, and each of the brigades working on a particular stretch deploy their specific artillery capabilities. Each of these core brigades fire 500 rounds of ammunition every day. Hence the question: can artillery, given that high rate of fire which causes barrels to wear out prematurely and affects their accuracy, fully replace unmanned capabilities? It is true that artillery can work in fog, but it too needs “eyes” to see where to shoot in fog. Drones have long since outpaced artillery by 10 Maсh’s in all other aspects, due largely to exhaustion and a lack of guns and munitions. And the fewer rounds are fired, the more successful enemy’s assaults are. The only way to stop this is by means of remote mining, round-the-clock patrolling to detect personnel and equipment movements, and by striking and inflicting damage, that is, the job commonly done by UAVs.
This in no way replaces the importance of artillery. Artillery is the king of battle, indeed, but the battle of the kind that we saw in 2022-2023. Today everyone is doing their part of the job of resistance. A tank can no longer get closer than 10 kilometers to the front line – it will otherwise get punctured just as easily as all other armored vehicles. We do not have even a single armored vehicle in our unit. You want to know why? Because we have already got so many thousands of enemy’s vehicles punctured that we realized that the presence of armored vehicles in our possession only draws undue attention to our crews, meaning additional risks to their lives. It is better not to stand out. An armored vehicle implies that it carries some important professional. But it is often the case that it can do little to protect against hits from ATGMs, for example. An FPV drone is easily suppressed with a mobile jammer. But if attacked with a drone armed with a high-explosive anti-tank warhead, especially controlled via fiber optic cable, a piercing hit is 100 percent guaranteed even if you ride in Donald Trump’s 3 million worth vehicle.
– What is your overall vision of the current situation on the frontline? Is the situation that bad as some are claiming it to be, or is it going as predicted?
– We should not entertain ourselves with expectations. There are armchair strategists who love it when we recapture something – like it was with the Kharkiv region and Kherson city during surprise Ukrainian counteroffensive in the Fall of 2022. But when the map grows red and the enemy is persistently advancing – they criticize. Have you forgotten who we are fighting with? Have you forgotten about the enemy’s superiority in everything, about our partnership — worried, agitated, sluggish? About support from partners who are too much reflecting on geopolitics and care more about their internal matters than about our critical needs…
– Do you believe in a truce? Ukrainians are now gripped by the euphoria of expectation of a soon end to hostilities.
– I believe in our strength. Because it is not about a truce, but about a cessation of hostilities, which seems a more likely scenario, and especially so if the world is told that Kyiv is ready to negotiate with Moscow. Doesn’t this signify an invitation for the aggressor to negotiate, signify that we have run out of steam, are ready to talk? Now that we ready to negotiate, it would definitely not be on our terms.
I believe in our strength, one that is within us all. Hostilities are more likely to be suspended than terminated. We must take off our rose-colored glasses.
Interviewed by Tetyana Nehoda, Kyiv
Photos personal courtesy of Robert “Madiar” Browdy
Source: Robert “Madiar” Browdy
