If you think that world politics lately resembles a script written by artificial intelligence after watching all seasons of the series “House of Cards”, you don’t think so. The rules of the game, if they ever existed, have been abolished. Ultimatums are being handed out via social media, great powers are losing influence, alliances are in limbo, international institutions are in profound crisis, and the concept of “stability” has become archaic.
In this new, weird world, where it is difficult to distinguish between strategic calculations and impulsive decisions, we are trying to understand: what is this – temporary chaos or the contours of a new reality? How do these processes affect key points of tension – in Ukraine and the Middle East? Is the Axis of Evil really as strong as advertised? Should we be expecting black swan events? What factors are most capable of undermining and leading to the fall of the Putin regime? Finally, what should we prepare for in the coming months?
Ukrinform discussed all this and more in a long conversation with Ihor Reiterovych, a political analyst, head of political and legal programs at the Ukrainian Center for Social Development, who remains surprisingly calm while analyzing this global performance.
– Mr. Ihor, the global political stage has recently resembled not so much a chess game as some kind of surreal performance. Events are changing at the speed of light, and sometimes it seems that logic is simply resting. What, in your opinion, are the key geopolitical “tremors” that define our world today? Can we already talk about the outlines of a new world order, or is this just the chaos of the transitional period?
– The key points of global tension today are, undoubtedly, Ukraine and the Middle East. Someone may argue that the significance of the Russo-Ukrainian war should not be exaggerated. But, in my opinion, this is just an example of the opposite — its extent and significance are underestimated. After all, this war is clearly a geopolitical event that has an impact far beyond our region. It changes the security and political contexts even in far-away countries.
Fortunately, for now we have managed to avoid the emergence of a third major point of tension – in particular, along the lines of the Indo-Pakistani conflict. There, both sides have been able to slow down just in time.
In the long term, I think that a certain truce will occur in the Middle East, and, perhaps, even quite sooner, at least when compared to the fourth year of the all-out war in Ukraine. At the same time, it must be appreciated that Russia will most likely continue seeking for or creating new centers of instability, especially on the European continent. They need to constantly remind the world of themselves – and, unfortunately, this is done through escalation.
Another important point when looking at the current state of the world order is the transformation of the role of the great powers who traditionally have claimed the status of a global mediator, leader or, let’s say, a political “roof” for other countries. This role has changed dramatically. And the matter is not only in the USA, although it is the United States that first comes to mind when talking about the loss of global supremacy.
This became especially noticeable during the Trump administration: in just six months, he managed to radically change not only the attitude towards himself personally or towards the American government, but, rather, towards the very phenomenon of the USA as a geopolitical power. And what do we see today? Lots of countries are increasingly making decisions without looking at opinions of Washington.
And what is most dangerous for the USA itself – we are not only talking about the national states that have always been in the category of rivals or even outright opponents of America. The behavior of even those countries that have been considered its proven partners for years has altered. This is a fundamental shift in the global context.
– And this year’s meeting of the organization G7 in Canada has demonstrated this too well…
– Yes, this is another important aspect. Old institutions, even those that operated in an informal format — such as the G7 — are gradually fading into the background. Their influence is declining, and most likely we will observe a competition for new leadership, attempts to strike new alliances, new centers of power. This process will drag on in time, but it has already got underway.
However, there is also a certain moment in this dynamics that can be called cautious optimism. The example of the Middle East — first the situation in Syria, now Iran — demonstrates that even those dictatorships that claim their leadership are unable to exercise the role of an honest mediator or a guardian of stability. The story with Iran is very indicative: in fact, Russia and China simply left it alone with its problems. China is still trying to support Tehran in some way, including at a practical level, but Russia, in fact, has abandoned all its previous commitments. Let’s call things by their proper names: Iran has been abandoned.
This signifies that, in the current global context, there is no sustainable and reliable center of power – neither among the traditional democratic players, nor among the authoritarian ones. In the short term, we will most likely witness a global reformatting. Instead of global “roofs”, previously provided by USA and the Soviet Union, regional alliances will come to the fore – more flexible, adapted to a specific context.
– The war between Israel and Iran seems to be taking on a new dimension. How do you see Israel’s goals – is it just the destruction of the nuclear program, or is it really about changing the political regime in Iran? And does Israel have enough of its own resources to ensure a successful shift of that scale?
– Honestly, at the moment I do not see any real prospects for regime change in Iran. On the one hand, there is a pretty powerful propaganda machine operating there, which creates the impression that everything is fine: the people have rallied around the Ayatollah, hate Israel, and are ready to endure anything — as long as they want and for the sake of the “supreme goal.” On the other, last week we saw serious Israeli dominance in the information field. Netanyahu publicly addressed the Iranian people, emphasizing that Israel is not at war with the Iranians, but it is at war with the regime. This was an attempt to separate the people and the government, but, in fact, we did not see any response. No one took to the streets to protest against the regime. On the contrary, those who did take to the streets demanded a retaliatory strike against Israel. And this is an important point: we do not see any active domestic opposition. Most of it, as in the case of the “good Russians,” is abroad. And the one that remained in the country was simply eliminated physically. We remember the shootings in the streets, the mass executions. In this context, the current regime remains quite strong and, unfortunately, with no visible cracks so far.
Two distinct possibilities exist there. In the short term, Israel, allied with the United States, will finish off the entire Iranian nuclear component, and then the parties will sit down at the negotiating table, a certain agreement will be reached, and the conflict will move on to the phase of political settlement. The other is that, should the United States not intervene and provide Israel with the requisite capabilities for the final destruction of the Iranian nuclear infrastructure — we are talking above all else about bunker-busting bombs, without which Israel simply will not be able to reach the underground facilities – then this war may drag on.
The problem is that the conflict with Iran is a war waged at long distances. It will be difficult for Israel to maintain a high intensity of fighting for a long while. By varying estimates up and down, they have weapons reserves that can sustain a maximum of two weeks of such a tempo. Israel is a small country, and it therefore cannot afford keeping vast weapons arsenals.
In order not to be unfounded, let’s recall October 7, 2023. After the Hamas attack, Israel quickly goes on the offensive, bombs the Gaza Strip, destroys terrorists and their infrastructure. But after a week and a half of active hostilities – and this on its own border! – the U.S. urgently begins to supply Israel with ammunition, and precisely the air bombs that had been used extensively at that time. They simply did not have enough reserves to sustain even that campaign.
– Against the background of these developments, Trump shows up again with his ultimatums. How realistic, in your opinion, is the scenario where the United States would get deeply involved in this conflict, and how would that change the situation in the Middle East?
– At first, Trump supposedly allowed Iran 24-48 hours – but these hours have already turned into two weeks. Today, he has two options to choose from: he U.S. either engages in the war, or he continues screaming, stamping his feet and demanding Iran to surrender. Meanwhile, Iran seems ready to sit down at the negotiating table. But the proposals coming from Tehran – or what they are ready to do – frankly, do not suit either Washington or Tel Aviv. So this is a game of nerves.
Having said that, I believe that Trump is wary of launching a full-scale military operation against Iran. True, he has already changed his mind once – literally the second day after it became obvious that Israel completely ignored his warnings, struck, and this strike turned out to be many times more effective than even the most optimists expected.
The Americans, as with Russia in 2022, clearly overestimated Iran’s potential. They believed that it was a powerful country capable of putting up fierce resistance, that Israel would not be able to act rapidly and determinedly. And it turned out that Trump, on the second day, was being reported: “Mr. President, the Israelis are doing whatever they want in the air, they are already bombing police stations, and they haven’t lost a single plane yet.” And this is a confirmed fact. The Iranians were able to shoot down only one heavy reconnaissance drone. Everything else looks more like the work of artificial intelligence…
Yes, Iran did respond. Yes, not all missiles were intercepted by Israel’s air defenses. But what happened on Iranian territory is of a completely different scale. When Trump saw this, I think his famous redhead itched: “Maybe we should get involved too?” But then, it seems, he let go a little. Or, perhaps, it wasn’t him who let go, but someone from his inner circle.
They say that Vice President J.D. Vance is categorically against military intervention and is convincing Trump to keep his distance. And public opinion polls suggest that most Americans do not support the idea of their country getting engaged in a military adventure. So Trump is hesitating.
But it cannot be ruled out that the U.S., just for the sake of a “beautiful final point”, will strike Fordow – the Iranian nuclear facility for uranium enrichment. And only after that will they sit down at the negotiating table and will start to negotiate.
And if Netanyahu suddenly digs his heels in, saying that Israel has yet to resolve all the issues with Iran, I will not be surprised if Trump starts pressuring Tel Aviv, supposedly saying, let’s negotiate sooner, I have already worked out my part, everything is settled. In the end, this situation will be like it is with Ukraine exactly. With the only difference that Israel is in a much stronger position. It is the dominant power in the region. And it therefore can afford much more. It was a story about the White House being faced with the fact: “We’ve already done it. Join in, if you want to.”
– How, in your opinion, has the war between Israel and Iran already affected the war in Ukraine? To what extent has this conflict already diverted the attention of the international community and the media from the Ukraine war? Is there a risk of the Kremlin emerging from isolation as a “mediator”?
– Regarding the impact the Israeli-Iranian conflict has had on the Russo-Ukrainian war, some diversion of attention is certainly there. But if we look at the practical consequences, the only tangible negative consequence for Ukraine so far is that about 20,000 American anti-drone missiles went not to us, but to the Middle East.
As for the focus, yes, indeed, Washington is current more immersed in the events in the Middle East. But I personally would not say that Trump has been an extremely effective mediator or strategist resolving the war in Ukraine. His involvement in the negotiations on the Russian-Ukrainian war was minimal, formal, and often chaotic.
As for Europe, it is worth noting: Europeans, of course, are watching out the events in the Middle East, but this does not mean at all that this topic dominates their agenda. This is not a situation where everyone suddenly forgot about Ukraine and massively shifted their focus to Israel or Iran.
Quite on the contrary: if you look at the G7 summit, the issue of Ukraine itself sounded stronger and more emphasized than the topic of the Israeli-Iranian conflict. Regarding Israel, there were standard diplomatic formulations like “we support Israel’s right to self-defense.” This was expressed, in particular, by German Chancellor Merz and other European leaders. But this topic did not become mainstream, neither did it dominate the rhetoric of the discussions.
Thus, there is no reason for excessive concern thus far.
– So, there are no risks for us at all?
– There are two potentially problematic points that may manifest themselves in the future – this is, first of all, the issue of oil prices. For now, the situation looks stable. Oil prices are fluctuating marginally, with no abrupt deviations. Iran has not blocked the Strait of Hormuz, which is a vital route for transporting oil, acting as a chokepoint for a significant portion of global oil shipments.
As regards Israel’s actions, they too are not yet affecting the Iranian oil infrastructure. Yes, there was one strike on the port, but, as far as we can judge, the target was not an energy facility, but an air defense system deployed on the territory of this port. That is, there were no attacks on oil fields or processing facilities by Israel thus far.
This may suggest that some informal agreements have been reached. Relatively speaking, war is war, and economy on schedule. I do not rule out that there is a tacit understanding between Israel and Arab monarchies, such as Saudi Arabia: do not touch the oil sector, because this is a completely different level of escalation, with consequences for the whole world.
– What about the Russian Federation?…
– There is a risk of Moscow attempting to squeeze into the Middle East game in order to then demand concessions for itself regarding Ukraine. On June 14, Trump stated for the first time that Russia, supposedly, could help as a mediator. But as soon as on June 18, his rhetoric changed: he stated that Putin had allegedly called and offered mediation services, to which Trump replied: “You’d better deal with Russia.”
This remark was followed by much reverberations throughout the world. They began saying that Trump was making it all up. But a few hours later, [Putin’s spokesman Dmitri] Peskov confirmed the fact of the conversation, although he tried to downplay it, saying that Trump “expressed himself figuratively.” And this is already an indirect confirmation that some initiative on the part of Putin did come out. It is unlikely that it was voiced as explicitly as Trump presented it. Most likely, Putin said something like: “Donald, I’m ready to engage in the process,” and Trump replied: “Thank you, Vladimir, but no need. We’ll figure it out ourselves.”
Why did Trump change his rhetoric so soon? Because on June 14, the situation was still uncertain, no one knew how it would develop. And a few days later, Trump is seriously considering whether to strike on Iran or not, whether to get engaged in the conflict or not. And here the question arises: why does he need Putin, why share the victory among three. The window of opportunity for Russia was very narrow, and it seems that it has already closed. Putin failed to take advantage of it, and this certainly benefits Ukraine.
Against this background, noteworthy is a statement by the Russian Foreign Ministry, saying, “We strongly urge the United States not to even think about striking Iran.” If someone translates this to Trump, the effect will be quite the opposite – he is unlikely to heed advice from Moscow.
So there is no need to dramatize right now – there are no serious negative consequences for Ukraine yet. But if the war in the Middle East drags on, then, of course, the consequences may be more significant. But for now, the conflict will hopefully not become protracted. And if that happens, it will be another slap in Russia’s face, which has a “strategic agreement” with Iran, but, as we see, has not helped Tehran in any way.
– And what about the Axis of Evil? Russia and Iran signed an agreement on a “comprehensive strategic partnership”, but at the crucial moment Moscow seems to prefer to watch the war from the sidelines. Doesn’t this indicate that this “axis” is more of a thread that breaks easily rather than a robust alliance?
– Absolutely true. Moreover, I would not consider these countries to be a kind of “axis of evil” at all. We often like to draw historical parallels, referring to the Tripartite Pact, the Anti-Comintern Pact of World War II, or the alliances of World War I. But the current situation is completely different. And no matter how paradoxical it may seem to someone, NATO remains the only military-political alliance working in the world today. In this alliance, there is indeed not only military but also political coherence, there are common documents, decision-making mechanisms, and most importantly, strategic commonality.
The so-called “axis of evil” — conventionally consisting of China, Russia, North Korea, Iran and its proxies (previously Syria, now someone else) — can hardly even be called an alliance. It is rather an entity that does not have any clear form. They do not share a common foreign policy, or a common strategy, nor agreed positions or official documents similar to those adopted by NATO. They do not jointly determine who are their allies and who are their adversaries. And they do not plan to do so any time soon.
In addition, any such alliance presupposes the presence of a dominant center of power. In this case, both Russia and China have ambitions for such a role. But objectively, only China has the potential to act as a real leader. Russia wants to be the center of gravity, but in terms of resources it has long been not suited for this role. China, for its part, acts much more prudently, building its influence with an eye on a very distant future.
Another important point is that the so-called “axis of evil” has become a hostage to its own rhetoric. They constantly reiterate: “We are building new alliances because we do not accept the global dominance of the United States, we are for a world of equal players.” But, excuse me, there can be no real equality in any “axis of evil.” This is nonsense. If you create a bloc or alliance, there is always someone in charge. This has been the case throughout history and will continue to be the case.
Want examples? The Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. The system was clear: there was a center — Moscow, there were satellites — the countries of Eastern Europe that were in subordinate role, and outside the bloc — Cuba, part of Africa, North Korea, where the Soviet Union had the status of “big brother”. It was a vertical of influence, and it worked within the logic of the world as it was at that time. And now there is nothing like that.
– They couldn’t even create any meaningful project based on the BRICS, for example…
– Yes. Russia attempted to impose its role as a leader, but it turned out poorly. Because the countries that are joining in or cooperating with BRICS are saying, “We are tired of the U.S. dictate”. Okay, but then the logical question is: why change one dictate for another? If you don’t like Washington, then why are you ready to change it for Beijing or Moscow? It’s a senseless swap.
Therefore, the “axis of evil” looks more like a beautiful label than a true bloc. And the case of Iran is a perfect demonstration of this: it is enough to press a little and this “axis” bursts at the seams. It does not stand tests, because it has neither trust, nor a clear hierarchy, nor joint decisions.
The only thing in which these countries really manage to coordinate at least something is the economy. And this, unfortunately, has real consequences. It is thanks to such economic mutual support that Russia has been able to continue its war against Ukraine for the fourth year now.
– Given the current policy pursued by the Trump administration, how do you view the main challenges in relations between Ukraine and the United States? Is it true, as it seems, that American military aid to Ukraine is being curtailed? And is the American military-industrial lobby able to somehow influence Trump’s decision, or is “not everything so clear-cut” there too?
– It’s not so much about cutting aid as about completing it in the usual format. Yes, there is still a certain reserve that would supposedly last till August or so. But there will be no more new packages like those endorsed by Biden. And we must admit this honestly.
From now on, our cooperation with the United States will be based on very simple, down-to-earth postulates. The minimum task for Ukraine is to maintain access to American intelligence. This is a vital point. Even if direct military assistance comes to naught, we must retain access to U.S. intelligence. Because this is critically important for our defense and for overall strategic planning.
And, as far as I know, even in the most gloomy and pessimistic scenarios that are being discussed in expert circles in Washington, the U.S. is willing to maintain this channel of cooperation. That is, even in the worst-case scenarios, there is no question of the U.S. refusing to provide intelligence to Ukraine.
What will happen next? Most likely, the formula for interaction with Trump will look as pragmatic as possible, and this is “money for weapons”. Ukraine either pays directly, or Europe transfers the money to the U.S., and they supply us with weapons. In other words, those packages of non-repayable aid we got accustomed to during the Biden era are unlikely to return.
Are any exceptions possible? Yes, if some “black swan” event happens that would make Trump fundamentally reconsider his position. But even in this case, it will be more about launching the lend-lease mechanism than about gifts. The format will be conditional: “you get it now, but will pay later”.
There is another tool that could theoretically work – the minerals deal, and the related fund could be filled with weapons. But I have a feeling that Trump no longer mentions this deal. It seems to have simply disappeared from his radar. Therefore, we must be prepared for the most realistic scenario: to pay ourselves or hope that Europe will pay for us. This will be a different logic of war – more driven by market, less by ideology.
– What are your impressions from the most recent G7 summit in Canada, in particular from Trump’s behavior there?
– I will say it bluntly: the death of the “Big Seven” in its classic format is most likely inevitable. And the blame for this is not collective. This is primarily the fault of the United States. Other G7 members, no matter how difficult it was for them, attempted to keep this format “afloat”. But destructive processes have already been launched. If we recall the period when the G7 was just forming, it was really a powerful informal club of influence. It did not have a charter or bureaucratic superstructure, but it could make decisions that had repercussions across the globe – economic, political, geostrategic. Over time, of course, disagreements arose between the countries – the G7 lost unity, gradually weakened, but still retained a certain weight in the world system.
Trump seems to be finally finishing off this format. Because when you start economic, political or trade wars with partners in the G7, it is difficult to expect that everyone will gather in a single circle of well-coordinated allies. Remember, he openly “ran up on” Canada first, then Germany, Japan… it is easier to say who he did not put pressure on, and it is probably only Great Britain.
This is not Trump’s merit or not, but, rather, the specifics of American-British relations. And it is also important to note: Prime Minister Starmer is navigating very well in this new reality. He understands perfectly well how to deal with Trump, and acts accordingly. Someone laughed at the situation where Starmer picked up the papers that fell out from Trump’s hands. They said, how is it that the leader of a once powerful empire bows to an American politician. But that’s normal: an old man is standing, the papers fell out of his hands, another person simply picked them up. This does not diminish one’s dignity. But Starmer achieved what he wanted. And this is always the main thing in politics.
Returning to Trump and his participation in the G7 summit, this is a very strange story. Both the visit itself and his surprise early departure raised many questions. There are different suggestions, but most of them are alarming. In preparation for this conversation, I reread several Western publications, including those in reputable media outlets, and they all explicitly hint on serious problems with Trump’s health during the summit.
In particular, it is noted that when he arrived at the meeting, he looked lethargic, was disoriented, and constructed phrases illogically. Some observers have associated this with the worst moments of the end of Biden’s presidency. But paradoxically, even Biden, in his weakest periods, did not voice the nonsense that Trump allowed himself during communication. Some sources have it that he behaved as if he did not understand at all why he had flown to the summit. Such behavior is worrying not only from a political point of view, but also from a medical point of view.
There is, of course, another explanation, suggesting that the real reason for his early departure was the escalation of the conflict between Israel and Iran, and Trump had to urgently deal with security issues. This is a possibility, indeed.
But it looks like the main reason was still personal discomfort. From the very beginning, something was not OK: Trump was reluctant to attend joint meetings, pose for joint photos, avoided the informal part of the summit. And, most likely, this was due to the fact that he understood – he would look, to put it mildly, not very good against the background of other leaders.
– And what about the suggestion that Trump, supposedly, did not want to meet with President Zelensky, discuss the recent massive attack on Kyiv, talk about sanctions against the Russian Federation?…
– I think that this is a possible explanation, but it is not the main one. In fact, the U.S. could well have given a signal to its partners: Trump’s participation in the discussions is possible only on condition that the issue of Ukraine is not pushed hard. And, quite possibly, some countries would have agreed to such a compromise — for the sake of the very presence of the U.S. at the table. This is how real diplomacy works.
Could the partners have restrained Zelensky in some way? Yes, they could. But not in a direct way — not to forbid him from speaking, of course, but rather to “soften” the topic. For example, to organize a short conversation between Zelensky and Trump in a tete-a-tete format, and confine themselves to that. Then each of them could say what they considered necessary after the meeting.
Zelensky could have showed up before the media to say: “I briefed the U.S. president about the bombardment attack, called for tougher sanctions against Russia.” And Trump — true to form — would have responded with a few general phrases, not being too specific. And that would have satisfied both.
Therefore, it seems to me that the reason for Trump’s hasty departure from the G7 summit was a little deeper than just a desire to avoid talking about Ukraine. It is already known that a reporter asked Trump about the bombardment attack, and his answer… Well, let’s put it this way — he really seemed surprised and asked when exactly it happened. And there is actually nothing strange in this. Because it is no news that Trump is not a fan of reading intelligence reports. It is publicly known: he does not read the reports analysts and intelligence agencies prepare for him. In the U.S., it is directly written that the president needs to be given short visual reports at least twice, and preferably three or four times a day, otherwise he simply “falls out of the information context”. For Trump, television is the main source of information. That is why they are even considering shooting videos for him formatted as briefings.
Therefore, I believe that he did not want to go to the summit at all. First, he had nothing to offer the G7 — no major diplomatic victory. Second, the topic of the war between Israel and Iran gave him a convenient pretext — he used it as a good excuse.
And his strange post about Macron? “Macron doesn’t know why I returned to the U.S. He said I left the G7 to work on an Israel-Iran ceasefire — that’s not true. It has nothing to do with a ceasefire. There’s a much bigger issue.” But he didn’t explain what it was. Instead, he flew to the U.S. and immediately held an overnight meeting with his military cabinet. The media began expecting an address to the nation, supposedly, a strike on Iran will be announced soon. And in the end — nothing like that happened. The president probably had a sleep, took some pills, calmed down, and everything dissolved in the air.
We are entering a very difficult year and a half, which will pass under the influence of cognitive changes — in particular, in the behavior of the U.S. president. And if the information that is currently shared among the political community — that Trump will soon begin showing up in public much less frequently — is confirmed, then the conclusions will become obvious.
– Another important summit awaiting us is the NATO summit in the Netherlands. They have already bowed to Trump by sharply reducing its duration to one single meeting. Should we expect any decisions at this summit that will change the situation for Ukraine, or will this be another “summit of hopes”?
– I don’t think we should expect any far-reaching decisions from this summit. Russia, as before, will be called the main strategic threat – that will definitely be reflected in the final communiqué. What will probably not be present there is a clear commitment that Ukraine will eventually become a member of NATO. But everything else, the key things will be present there one way or another.
The agenda will probably also include additional financial support for Ukraine. Perhaps it will not be included in the final document. But this can be implemented through separate procedures after the summit.
The main idea of this event is to assuage U.S. President Donald Trump’s demand, which is for countries to agree to significantly boost defense spending, aiming to reach 5% of their respective GDP on defense and defense-related spending by 2032. The proposal includes a core target of 3.5% of GDP, plus an extra 1.5% for a wider set of spending related to defense, with a regular verification mechanism to ensure compliance.
This will happen at the end of Trump’s second presidency. That is, the allies will essentially tell him: “We are ready” so that there are no unnecessary emotions on his part…
The duration of the summit has been reduced to 2.5 hours – everything has been formalized and neutralized to the maximum extent possible. Meaningful, substantive decisions, in particular those regarding support for Ukraine, will be discussed afterwards, in a working mode.
It is certainly necessary to go to the summit. The invitation is there – and this is important. But no high hopes should be pinned on the wording in the final document. It means for us not to focus too much on rhetoric, but continue a direct dialogue: with the leadership of the Alliance, with individual countries. But it is better not to touch the USA right now – they clearly demonstrate a desire to be “peacemakers” and “mediators”.
– Defense analysts are increasingly warning about signs of Russia preparing for war with NATO, saying this scenario is possible as soon as this year. The Baltic countries are in the crosshairs. How realistic does such a scenario look? Will the U.S. recurse itself, or will Europe finally “show teeth” not in words but in deeds?
– The probability of a conflict on NATO’s eastern flank does exist. But at the moment it is not too high — Russia does not have enough strength for this. Theoretically, they can go all-in, but it does not yet look like they are ready for such a move. Most likely, Russia will continue acting at the level of psychological pressure.
How to respond to this? In Europe, there is an understanding of the threats, but, I believe, they should switch to a simple and understandable algorithm of actions. If the Russians are conducting exercises on the border — say, in Belarus — then NATO should conduct its own exercises at the same time: on the border, but on the other side — in Poland, the Baltic countries, etc. Such a symmetrical response is the most effective tool now.
Each country on the eastern flank will continue reinforcing its defenses. I do not rule out the possibility that, at the NATO summit, some allies, in particular the Baltic states, will attempt to reach an agreement with Trump regarding the deployment of additional American forces. We are not talking about thousands, but about a symbolic presence – a few hundred soldiers, as a kind of “human shield”.
Basically, NATO will certainly continue strengthening its eastern flank. This issue is no longer debatable – there is a consensus in this regard. Another issue is the pace. Currently, the logic prevailing in the Alliance seems to be that while Russia is deeply bogged down in the war against Ukraine, it simply does not have the resources to launch another front. Therefore, NATO still has time – and they will obviously try to use this time to the maximum effect possible.
– What, in your opinion, were the real motives for Russia’s devastating attack on Kyiv overnight on June 17?
– Russia has two consistent goals to achieve, and they have not changed for at least the last two years. They have only intensified after Trump’s return to the While House. Russia has finally moved on to outright terror aimed at intimidation.
This is a continuation of the Russian plan, which they are not abandoning: to break the morale of the Ukrainians, sow the feelings of fatigue, powerlessness, and disappointment. The idea is simple – to provoke internal irreversible processes in Ukraine, which, according to their calculations, will weaken our defenses and open up new opportunities for advancement deeper into Ukraine.
The second goal is to signal to West — look, we can rack up the points higher and higher, we have no breaks. Putin seems to be demonstrating: “I’m insane. I have a relevant health certificate.”
By the way, here he partially replicates the style of President Nixon, who deliberately built an image of the unpredictable so that others would be afraid to deal with him. This is a well-known concept – Madman theory, the theory of political madness. As Nixon said, I have a habit of behaving in such a way that everyone thinks that I can break down at any moment – and therefore it is better not to deal with me.
But there is an abyss between Nixon and Putin. Nixon, compared to Putin, is a pure, innocent girl, if we talk about the attitude towards the world. Putin does not just declare this “theory of madness”, but makes it a reality in a bloody way, and thereby attempts to make the West believe that he is negotiable, but only on his own terms.
– What do you think of Keith Kellogg’s forthcoming visit to [Belarusian president Aleksandr] Lukashenko for negotiations on an end to the war? What is it all about?
– This is really a bit of a strange story. But, in my opinion, it has a logical explanation. There is information that Lukashenko has become more active in the last few months, sending signals to the Europeans: I am not like Putin, I can be a mediator, don’t write me off from the game. And it is quite possible that the Europeans have transmitted these signals to the Americans. And they thought: why not try?
Lukashenko, indeed, exaggerates his significance, but the fact remains: he can call Putin. He has a direct channel. And this is already a resource. Plus, there is another scenario: the Chinese could have been involved in this. Perhaps Xi Jinping talked to Lukashenko, and then told the Americans: try to use this channel, maybe it will help influence Moscow’s position to get the situation out of the dead end.
In my opinion, all this looks like a typical probing the soil: it will work out – fine, it won’t work out – not a disaster either. The Americans, after all, need to demonstrate that they are looking for options. So if this visit does take place, the only one who will definitely benefit from it is Lukashenko himself. He will maximize the media hype. He is certainly a cynical and toxic character – there are no illusions about this. But you can’t deny him political cunning and the ability to survive.
– Putin declared his readiness to meet with Zelensky, but refused to recognize him as legitimate for signing agreements. How, in your opinion, should we behave in this respect?
– We should have responded to such statements in very simple and clear terms a long time ago. We need to systematically question the legitimacy of Putin himself –arguably, consistently and loudly. We sometimes mention this, but quickly forget. And in vain.
Look, Russia is promoting a narrative: they say, the Verkhovna Rada is legitimate, and Zelensky is not. If we translate this logic to Russia itself, we get a mirror image of the situation. The State Duma may be partially legitimate — because most of the deputies were elected in territories that are not occupied. But Putin is not, because he was “re-elected”, in particular, in currently occupied Ukrainian lands. That is, he is not the legitimate president of the Russian Federation. And this is exactly how we should build our information policy in response.
Instead, we have chosen the tactic: “let’s explain again why we are legitimate”. But who doubts this? There was a brief indignation from Trump, but it quickly subsided.
As for Putin’s statements proper, they are not about “negotiations”. This is a game for the West. He said that he is ready to meet with Zelensky, but only after elections. In fact, he is not ready for anything — because, firstly, he is simply afraid of a personal meeting, and secondly, in his opinion, the only topic for a conversation is for Ukraine to sign a surrender. Which, of course, will never happen.
So, this is another attempt to throw the old bone to Western partners — supposedly “Zelensky is not legitimate.” As we can see, it didn’t work. The reaction is close to zero.
– In the fourth year of full-scale war, what factors, in your opinion, are most capable of undermining and leading to the fall of the Putin regime? Do you believe in the possibility of a “black swan” event?
– Putin’s death will undoubtedly be that “black swan” event.” Because, judging by how he looks and how his inner circle pretends that everything is fine, it seems that this scumbag is not going to die for the next 10 years. And that is why his sudden death will be a shock.
Because Putin did not build a system for transferring power. There is no mechanism, no “successor”, no plan. And all of Russia, in the event of his disappearance, finds itself on the brink of an abyss — they simply do not know what to do next. And so, this is the classic “black swan” scenario: an event that no one is prepared for and that dramatically changes reality.
Another “black swan” for Russia could be a sudden economic collapse. And, by the way, everything is gradually getting to that point. “Guns instead of butter” will sooner or later start playing against them. But we must admit: they still have a certain margin of safety. At least until the fall of this year.
What can really undermine Russia from within? First of all, a socio-economic crisis. Massive. Profound. Because it is precisely this that can break through the concrete of fear that keeps society in submission. Theoretically, a conspiracy of elites is possible. But I am more skeptical in this regard. Because while the West is not giving clear signals: “organize – and we will come to an agreement with you later.” And before, there were such signals coming in. However, with the advent of Trump, this is no longer the case.
– What are your expectations regarding the further development of the situation in the Ukraine-USA-Russia triangle in the coming weeks and months? Is it really necessary, as many say, to “wait until autumn”, because there are no other options? Can “surprises” happen sooner?
– I am inclined to believe that meaningful negotiations can start in the fall. And our main task is to hold out until then. And then we will see how it turns out.
On the other hand, we ourselves started this conversation by saying that Trump is a completely unpredictable player. And it is quite possible that at some point he will simply go and do something unexpected. For example, put pressure on Russia, impose new sanctions, or start transferring powerful weapons to us. Theoretically, this is a possibility. Practically, it is unlikely. It is not worth focusing on this scenario. It is important for us to remain sober. I think that sooner or later both Trump and the American authorities in general will be forced to change their strategy towards Russia. Because the Russian Federation will not stop this war at the request of the United States. And the White House will ultimately understand this. And then, I do hope, they will make decisions that will be favorable for Ukraine.
That said, however, I absolutely do not believe in a scenario where the United States will eventually distant itself from the process and abandon us. This is unrealistic. It will not happen. And though cautious, it is still a reason for optimism.
So, our logic should be simple: believe in the best, but prepare for the worst. Live in a reality where in the next few months we are unlikely to receive anything more from the U.S., except for words and marginal support.
Myroslav Liskovych led this conversation
