In modern politics, what is said in public rarely matches what happens behind closed doors. This is an era of hybrid threats and political theater, where every word has a subtext and each and every gesture carries a hidden purpose. Donald Trump calls Volodymyr Zelenskyy “nice” but avoids a direct answer to the question about the transfer of Patriot air defense systems to Ukraine. Viktor Orbán appeals to the “voice of two million Hungarians” who, according to him, are “objecting Ukraine’s accession to the EU,” while he is actually relaying the Kremlin’s messages. How should Kyiv and Brussels respond to cut the Hungarian prime minister down to size? The final communiqué of the most recent NATO summit declares unity, but will it stand a real test of strength, or will Article 5 be invoked immediately if Russia still dares attack a NATO member nation? Meanwhile in Strasbourg, the foundation of the future Nuremberg-2 Tribunal for Russian’s crime of aggression has been laid down: an agreement has been signed to establish a Special Tribunal to investigate the crime of Russian aggression against Ukraine. But what’s next? When can we expect real charges and verdicts for Putin and his accomplices?
Ukrinform discussed these and more topics in a conversation with a person who knows international politics from the inside – an authoritative Ukrainian diplomat, former Minister of Foreign Affairs Volodymyr Ohryzko (2007-2009).
– Mr. Volodymyr, signing an agreement with the Council of Europe to establish a Special Tribunal for Russia’s war crimes is an indisputable diplomatic success. But what does this mean in practice? Can we talk about a real prospect for the Nuremberg-2 Tribunal for the crime of aggression committed by the Kremlin leaders?
– The Nuremberg Trials took place under completely different historical circumstances: Germany was occupied, and war criminals were put under arrest. As far as we are concerned, this is not the case yet. But another important thing is that the new tribunal will operate in absentia, that is, without the presence of the defendants. And this is extremely important. After all, unlike the International Criminal Court in The Hague, which requires the physical presence of defendants in the courtroom, this one provides a mechanism that allows not waiting for the perpetrators to be caught or extradited.
Another key point is that the process is definitely underway. The signatures of the President of Ukraine and the Secretary General of the Council of Europe have already been placed. This means that the legal framework has been created, and now it is up to the countries that intend to join the agreement: first, signing, then ratification by national parliaments. This process will expectedly last until the beginning of next year, and the tribunal will be able to be fully operational in 2026.
What is unique about this tribunal? Usually, it takes years for international institutions to collect evidence, verify facts, testimonies, and documents. Here, the situation is completely different. Most of the evidence has already been collected, recorded and documented by the perpetrators themselves. And we are not talking about war crimes or crimes against humanity or genocide – that is what the Hague Criminal Court deals with. This tribunal will consider one of the gravest international crimes – the crime of aggression. The actual decision to attack, the discussion of the details – this has all been publicly documented. The video of Putin holding relevant meeting on the eve of the invasion in February 2022, where [director of the Foreign Intelligence Service Sergei] Naryshkin’s hands are shaking, is not just footage, it is explicit evidence. They did not just attend – they initiated the crime.
Therefore, when the tribunal starts working, the process of considering the cases can be quite fast. Everything is already on the surface. I do hope that next year will see the first verdicts. I presume the verdicts will be against two or three dozen people. We already know the key figures – not only Putin and members of his inner circle, but also dozens of Russian army generals who directly planned and committed the crime of aggression.
We are on the right track. Because accountability for a crime is not a matter of politics. It is a matter of principle: law, justice and memory. And this principle should always work, without ant exceptions whatsoever.
– What should be the role of Ukraine in this story? Should we do something at the national level?
– The first step is to be taken by Ukraine. It is the Prosecutor General’s Office that must submit the relevant documents to the Special Tribunal, supplemented with a request to launch consideration of cases against Russian war criminals. And it is necessary to start preparatory work now to ensure that this submission meets all the requirements of international law. It is not only about the facts, but also about the legal quality of the documentation. But in general, this is more of a technical issue. It means most that the tribunal start working at the earliest time possible.
– Hungary has held its so-called “referendum”, and now Viktor Orban declares that he will speak “with the voice of two million Hungarians” who are opposing Ukraine’s accession to the EU. Does Brussels possess workable mechanisms to “tie Orban’s hands” where it comes to EU enlargement decisions that require a consensus to be passed?
– Technically, the EU currently does not have mechanisms that would allow it to circumvent one member country’s veto authority – the principle of unanimity remains in effect. And this is truly a huge problem, which the European Union itself is now well aware of. It is precisely Hungary’s position, which is effectively blocking the process, that may ultimately end up in a revision of the decision-making procedure as such. This is maturing into a necessity.
Against the background of Hungary and Slovakia increasingly clearly distancing themselves from the common EU line, Brussels will probably look for informal but tangible economic levers of influence. And this, I believe, is the most rational approach under the current circumstances. In particular, this influence can be in the form of suspending financial support – and this is tens of billions of euros, without which Hungary will not last long. Another option for pressure may be to limit its voting rights. And then Budapest’s position will simply lose its meaning, period.
Whether the EU will take these steps is difficult to predict. Because we see how Orban’s rhetoric is evolving – he is already explicitly stating that he does not want to see Ukraine in the EU, because it allegedly threatens the Hungarian economy.
All this is a political line dictated by Moscow. And as long as the Orban regime remains in power, I am not expecting any changes in its policy. However, the situation may change next year after the elections in Hungary. And then a real opportunity will arise for Ukraine’s accelerated accession to the EU.
Why do I talk about “accelerated accession”? Because, according to the information coming to us from Brussels, preparations for the negotiation process have already got underway – it will take place on a parallel track with talks with Moldova, albeit informally. Negotiations on Ukraine’s accession to the EU in all clusters, in my opinion, will begin before a political decision is made. And when the window of opportunity opens up, they will simply be formalized retrospectively. And this is a good scenario.
– And what, in your opinion, should be Kyiv’s reaction? Don’t you think that we are reacting too gently to Orban’s behavior?
– My feeling is that the time has come to react to Viktor Orban’s actions in a much harsher fashion. For too long we have demonstrated a delicacy that Hungary does not deserve, especially in a situation where its current prime minister is an outright pro-Moscow puppet.
I have repeatedly cited the example of Hungary’s involvement in crimes during World War II. But for some reason we prefer not to raise these topics, saying that it is better to maintain “diplomatic silence”. However, now that Hungary is not just acting destructively within the EU, but is bluntly working against the interests of Ukraine, we must finally raise that question clearly and publicly.
What was Hungary’s part in the genocide on the territory of Ukraine? How did this country compensate the Ukrainian people for the losses incurred? Where is its apology for complicity in the war on the side of Nazi Germany? This is not just rhetoric but a matter of historical justice.
We have every right to raise these topics – not out of revanchist considerations, but the position of historical memory and modern political accountability. All it takes is political will. And why this political will is still not there is a question to be asked themselves by decision-makers.
– The Hague NATO summit, contrary to multiple skeptical forecasts, is considered by commentators to be pretty successful for Ukraine. Do you agree with the assessment that Kyiv has “squeezed the maximum possible out of this event”? And where exactly, in your opinion, does this success, real albeit non-public, lie, besides the commitments outlined in the final communiqué?
– I have to admit that I used to belong to the camp of skeptics rather than optimists regarding the Summit’s possible results. Why? Because, given Trump’s pro-Moscow rhetoric, I did not expect him to be particularly favorable to Ukraine. But, in my opinion, the situation was significantly changed by the course of events in the Middle East – in particular, the war between Israel and Iran and the U.S. direct involvement in the final stage. It was then when Trump felt like a triumphant, a winner. And the Europeans saw it quite clearly. The have played it out wisely and subtly: they did everything they could to make Trump feel great, unsurpassed, and irreplaceable in The Hague. And they succeeded. What we saw at the Summit was the result of this peculiar, but fully conscious European strategy.
Yes, it was outright flattery. But, oddly enough, it was done with a noble goal – to maintain the unity of the West and avoid the “tectonic shift” that everyone feared Trump might cause. And they did maintain it. Trump publicly reaffirmed his commitment to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty – that is, guarantees of collective defense. This is important.
Another victory for Trump” is the decision to increase defense spending to 5% of GDP. Though if you look deeper, we are talking about a long-term, gradual process, stretched out over time. Especially considering currency fluctuations, inflation, and economic dynamics. In fact, there are no real changes taking place yet, but for Trump, all that means is not the fact, but the declaration of victory. And he did it.
For Ukraine, the main thing is that the final communiqué clearly states: Russia is a long-term threat. This is an important political assessment. In addition, NATO’s defense spending now includes aid to Ukraine. This means that any Western state can provide us with funding or weapons and count it as its contribution to common security. And therefore, new opportunities for obtaining support are opening up. Another positive signal is that Trump met with Zelensky.
– Trump called President Zelensky “very nice,” while simultaneously increasing his harsh rhetoric against Putin. How do you, a diplomat, view such personal assessments? Is this evidence of a real change in policies, or is it Trump’s usual play on words, which could change to the opposite tomorrow?
– After all the statements by Trump that we heard ahead of the summit in The Hague, I sincerely doubted that this meeting would take place at all. But, as we can see, a combination of factors – in particular, the situation in the Middle East and the feeling of a victorious moment for Trump – helped him overcome his own prejudices and still listen to Zelensky.
On that matter I am entirely convinced that the President of Ukraine came to the meeting well prepared. This is confirmed by the assessments that were made after their conversation. It was clear that Zelensky managed to communicate to Trump the things that he either did not know or was reluctant to admit.
So, this conversation gives grounds for cautious optimism – perhaps Trump’s position will at least partially change towards Ukraine. Although, given his unpredictability, there can be no guarantees of this happening, of course.
– As you rightly noticed, Trump counts the “triumph” in the Middle East as his personal success. Could this encourage him, in the wake of this yet unproven success, to apply his doctrine of “peace through strength” to the Russo-Ukrainian war?
– It is obvious that Trump will not act against the Kremlin as decisively as he did in the case of Iran – no one is expecting strikes on Moscow. But should he have chosen the strategy of “peace through economic strength”, he could have achieved tangible results. After all, the current state of the Russian economy is actually a pre-infarction stage. And if Trump had dared to activate the existing tools of economic pressure, he could have brought this “disease” to its logical end. And this would be a blow from which the Kremlin would never be able to recover.
Why doesn’t he do this? It’s perhaps because of the fears — that the risk that the patient will not just get sick, but die is too great. If the entire arsenal of sanctions available to the United States were used to full extent today, the Russian economy would hardly last for several months. But it seems that Trump is not ready to take this step. From Secretary of State Marco Rubio, for example, we constantly hear that Trump is “weighing”, “thinking”, “considering”, but this has not yet translated in concrete actions.
I get the impression that the current administration is not yet ready for such a tough, “nuclear” economic scenario. And in vain. Because this could bring Putin back to reality.
So if Trump had dared to take a decisive step – activated economic pressure to full extent – this war could have ended much sooner.
– The most important issue now is about weapons, most particularly Patriot air defense systems and related missiles. Speaking at a news briefing on the sidelines of the NATO summit, Trump did not say “no”, but he did not give a clear positive answer either. How should this be interpreted, in your opinion?
– This is definitely better than a categorical “no”. So, chances are still there. Information has emerged implying the possibility of five Patriot systems being transferred to Ukraine – either as a sale or as aid. This is an extremely important signal, and now everything possible must be done to support this initiative and not let Trump forget it or get it sunk in empty talk. On the contrary, it is worth setting up a political background for him in which the implementation of this idea will look advantageous for him personally.
The Hague Summit’s decision to remove barriers in defense production is another one of enormous significance for Ukraine. Even if the U.S., for political reasons, is reluctant to supply us with weapons directly at some stage, it will be able to do so indirectly – through European partners. This decision creates a flexible model that allows us to move forward even in difficult political environments.
– There are suggestions that Russia is preparing for a direct conflict with NATO, perhaps even this year, with its sights set on the Baltic states. How realistic is this scenario after the Alliance demonstrated its unity at The Hague? Will Putin dare to take such a step to test the Allies’ commitment to collective defense and Article 5, and will it be invoked immediately as the situation requires?
– Regarding Article 5, actually, I am grateful to Trump. Because, despite all the risks involved, he may become the figure who will finally initiate a discussion about its content and interpretation. If we look at the text of the article as it was formulated at the time the Washington Treaty was being drawn up and signed, it will become obvious: today there are many things that need to be clarified, specified, and updated to modern realities.
And if NATO member states took up this work now – systematically, professionally, and with due account taken of the emerging challenges – it would only be beneficial, both for the Alliance as a whole and for each individual Ally. Article 5 should not be just a symbolic guarantee, but a clearly written mechanism for action in the event of aggression.
As for the question of whether Russia is capable of attacking a NATO member state today? I would doubt that. From what we are witnessing on fronts of the Russo-Ukrainian war, Russian troops are advancing a meager 50-100 meters daily, and even this at the cost of huge losses. And this is the maximum they are capable of for now.
If we compare NATO’s capabilities with those of Russia, just compare weapons, technologies, logistics, then any attempted direct attack on an Alliance member country would be suicidal for Russia. But we understand who we are dealing with. These are not rational politicians, but people living in an alternative universe. And that is why we must be ready for anything.
– So, you still do not rule out this possibility…
– I do not rule out the possibility of Russian provocations, which is fully in line with the Kremlin’s current tactics. These provocations occur on an almost regular basis. It is too bad that NATO continues turning a blind eye to this, pretending that it is not a drone, not a plane that flew into its airspace, not ships that convoy Russia’s shadow fleet of oil tankers. NATO, regrettably, is still swallowing this down. But where it comes to potential full-scale war against NATO, Russia simply does not have the resources for this. Its army is too exhausted, the economy is overstrained, and equipment and human reserves are limited. The Kremlin can create the illusion of being strong, but waging a large-scale war with a powerful military alliance is clearly beyond its capabilities at the moment. For Moscow, any serious attack on NATO member countries would likely be the last or penultimate day of its existence.
Myroslav Liskovych led this conversation
Source: Volodymyr Ohryzko, former Ukrainian Foreign Minister, head of the Center for Russian Studies
